No. 103·中文精读

把近200万美元营收全退给客户,Factory CEO 把软件「黑灯工厂」讲透了

Factory's Matan Grinberg: The Coming ‘Dark Factory’ Where Software Builds Itself

Factory 创始人兼 CEO 谈 2023 年就做全自主编码 Agent 的过早押注、穿越荒漠的两年,以及把收入退还给客户的决定。

节目音频00:00 / 51:31
中文精读由 AI 基于原始访谈改写,非官方翻译,可能存在偏差或错误;表述以原节目为准。

先讲一个少见的公司操作。Factory 创业头两年,营收爬到了将近200万美元。然后 CEO 决定:把这些钱,全部退给客户。

理由很直接。销售把东西卖出去了,开发者用得却不开心。继续收钱等于埋雷,客户迟早流失,口碑一起赔进去。于是全退,并承诺三个月后再来,这次保证让客户满意。

讲这个故事的人叫马坦·格林伯格(Matan Grinberg),Factory 联合创始人兼 CEO,公司做软件开发的自主智能体,内部叫 droids。这是他第二次上红杉的播客 Training Data,主持人帕特·格雷迪(Pat Grady)说,能二刷的嘉宾是少数,他们算这个赛道里的黑马:前面有 Claude Code、Cognition 这些领跑者,Factory 正在追上来。

这期对话密度很高:怎么熬过「早两年等于错两年」的沙漠期,为什么支持多家模型的 harness 反而比模型厂自家的更强,token 的钱该怎么分配,以及一个具体预测:12到24个月内,90% 的 token 会变成异步任务。逐段拆。

早两年,和错两年,是一回事

Factory 成立于2023年4月。那时候企业市场连 GitHub Copilot 都刚消化完,全自主智能体纯属超前。马坦形容头两年是「沙漠之旅」:方向后来被证明是对的,但工程师没准备好,企业采购更没准备好。

帕特想夸他愿景超前,他的回应成了这期节目的金句。

「提前两三年,和做错,是一回事。」

他的解释很实在:没人给「早」发奖金,没有安慰奖,要么做成,要么没做成。他本人从博士退学创业,之前从没上过一天班,企业销售对物理学家完全是陌生领域。两年里,他说服了20个自己认识的最聪明的人辞职加入,这些人有家庭有孩子,陪着公司一家家客户敲门。

沙漠没白走。他们摸清了企业客户最在意的底线:模型独立性,别让任何人掌握自己的命运。企业吃过云时代的亏,AWS、Azure 当年签三年长约,补贴价便宜得很,续约时直接翻十倍。想跑?先来一次两年的迁移。所有人都留了疤。

所以面对 Claude Code、Codex 这些自带分发的产品,Factory 的打法是:企业照样能用到顶级模型的性能,但不被任何一家模型厂锁死,新模型更快更便宜,直接热插拔。

帕特追问:那会不会只是把锁定对象换成了 Factory?马坦的回答是,所有自动化脚本、技能注册表、配置产物都留在客户自己的代码库里,Factory 手里没有扣着不放的「部落知识」,帮客户做模型套利省下的成本也归客户。建立信任的方式,是让客户随时可以走。

退钱的逻辑:让客户痴迷,才算数

回到退款。驱动这个决策的,是 Factory 的一条运营原则:创造痴迷的客户(create obsessed customers)。

这是对贝索斯「客户痴迷」的一次翻转。马坦认为,对客户痴迷是个输入指标,输入指标不值得考核。原话相当损:

「你可以对客户痴迷到他们给你申请限制令。」

他打了个篮球的比方:教练不会在赛前叮嘱队员「记得出汗」,教练说的是「得分」。出汗是得分的副产品。同理,对客户痴迷是手段,客户痴迷于你才是结果。考核输出,别考核输入。

拿这把尺子一量,当时的产品不及格。于是有了退款,有了那场全员会。马坦说那是他人生最糟的月份之一,会议室里所有人的脸都白了:这是不是沉船前的信号?对投资人也不好开口,他记得跟红杉的肖恩·马奎尔(Shaun Maguire)摊牌:之前那些「营收在涨」的更新,马上要归零了。

团队没散。他的归因有两条:一是早期招人极其狠,只收真正痴迷于「把自主性带给软件工程」这个使命的人;二是不装,直接承认处境有多糟,竞品营收疯涨,我们把营收退光了,必须振作。队里有赛艇运动员,赛艇是纯粹的痛苦运动,一个数字衡量一切。共同熬过谷底,才铸出最深的纽带。

一个背景数字:Factory 起步估值500万美元。马坦说,如今很多竞品生下来就是独角兽,从没体验过缺钱的滋味。而他的团队见过谷底,没有一个人离开。

反直觉:多模型 harness,比原厂自家的更强

转折点很具体:2025年9月26日,Factory 发布 Droid CLI,一个能接入所有主流模型的命令行智能体,性能当时是第一梯队。选时点有讲究,公司成立两年多,市场也终于就位:大多数工程师已经在用自动补全,开始尝试对话式地派活给智能体。

主持人索尼娅·黄(Sonya Huang)问了个自然的问题:模型变强,是不是最重要的变化?马坦说不完全是。最大的变化是开发者,尤其企业里的开发者,愿意放下防备去试了。工程师的工作流花了30年建立,很多人原本的态度是「我的手艺 AI 干不了」。改变靠几股力凑到一起:模型确实强了,要设的护栏少了;组织里更「智能体原生」的同事开始示范;还有 Andrej Karpathy 的推文,他一松口,一批工程师跟着改观。听起来好笑,行为改变就是这么发生的。

接下来是全场技术含量最高、也最反直觉的一段。业界默认假设:自己训模型,自己写 harness,协同设计,效果最好。索尼娅也是这个直觉。马坦说,他那些 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 的朋友听了会沮丧,但事实相反:支持多家模型的 harness,会比单一模型配套的 harness 更强。

他给了一个类比。GPT-3 之前,很多人想用自己的全部数据训练「懂我」的私人 AI,结果答案是:拿整个互联网训练出来的模型,比只用你的数据训练的好用得多。映射过来,数据之于模型,等于模型之于 harness。喂给 harness 的模型越多,越不会过拟合到某一家模型的怪癖,还能把从一家身上学到的技巧,用来改进另一家的表现。

证据很硬:在 Terminal-Bench 被刷爆之前,每个新的 Opus 或 GPT 模型发布,在 Droid 里的跑分都比在 Claude Code 或 Codex 里更高。模型厂当然希望自家模型配自家 harness 才最强,这样用户只能买全家桶。现实没配合。

harness 的功力藏在哪?马坦列了几项:

  • 缓存命中率。缓存命中的 token 价格大约是十分之一,缓存策略直接决定成本。
  • 压缩时的信息保持。长会话会超出上下文限制,harness 要做摘要压缩,业内叫「大海捞针」测试:长线程里埋一条关键信息,压缩后还在不在。
  • 工具调用的稳健程度,能不能用环境验证自己干的活。

他还用两个模型的「性格」举例。Opus 像那个特别好相处的同事,跟它说有20件事要干,它回复:其中5件其实不用干,我换了个更省事的做法,晚上喝一杯?GPT-5.6 则是强迫症式执行者,20件事一件不落,不睡完不成。早年 Claude Code 在 harness 层面严格盯住待办清单,因为模型本身爱跑偏;Codex 不用盯,模型自己就是强迫症。但用户要的是一致体验,换模型,待办清单不能凭空消失。清单为什么重要?一次大规模迁移做到第七步,会话压缩把清单弄丢,智能体忘了第七步是什么,故障就来了。

顺带说基准测试。Terminal-Bench 是他们当年力推的,比偏 Python 单文件改动的 SWE-bench 更贴近真实开发,如今已被刷到90%分。好基准的半衰期只有三到六个月,很快进训练数据。

token 的钱,从狂刷走向分配

节目里有一段企业 AI 采购的阶段性总结,相当生动:

  • 阶段零:没人信 AI。
  • 阶段一:全信了。董事会问 CEO,你的 AI 战略呢?CEO 回头吼 CTO,让所有人都用起来。
  • 阶段二:CTO 把 AI 使用量写进绩效,公开排名谁用的 token 最多,因为工程师固执,不推不动。
  • 阶段三:token 狂刷。所有人拿最贵的 Opus 干一切,包括问旧金山今天天气。

马坦说,有合作的银行每个月花几十万美元,就花在「天气怎么样」「讲讲 Python」这种谷歌一下就有的问题上。根源是当年太怕没人用,矫枉过正,不计代价换采用。他觉得这个顺序反而对:先证明有用,再谈成熟,比一开始就限制用途快得多。

Factory 的解法是 Router,按任务动态路由模型。问天气用不着人类智能的最前沿;COBOL 老代码库,微调过的专用模型可能比 Opus 合适;要可靠性,可以 OpenAI 生成、Anthropic 测试、Gemini 复查。路由规则甚至能用自然语言写,比如「别让 Pat 用开源模型」。索尼娅补刀:那就给 Pat 上 Gemini Flash。

开源模型的进展是另一个数据点。马坦对 GLM 5.2 的评价是「不可思议」:Factory 内部工程师不设 token 上限,一半的内部 token 流向开源模型,更快、更便宜、性能不差。他提醒一个常见的比较错误:GLM 5.2 该对标上一代的 Opus 4.7 或 GPT-5.5,拿它跟最新款比当然差半代,开源模型天然晚一步。真正该问的是:开源模型能不能追平「前沿减一代」?答案明确是能。

趋势数据:年初,Factory 客户侧流向开源模型的 token 不到1%;一季度到个位数百分比;现在已经跨入两位数。他的预测是,token 份额最终会渐进趋向开源占绝大多数,因为更便宜、选择更多,但永远到不了100%。前沿智能永远有价值,关键决策的那1% token,杠杆完全不同。

他管这套思路叫智能分配,配了个生活版:给女儿找代数家教,不用请爱因斯坦,高中生就够了,除非她将来要当物理学家。推到工程师身上同理:一天里大部分时间脑力占用其实很低,写文档是典型。Stripe 靠顶级文档吃过红利,但让最聪明的工程师花几小时写文档,是低杠杆用法。把低杠杆时刻全部自动化,让「灵光一现」从一天几分钟,变成一次几小时。

商业模式也顺着这个逻辑走。现在按用量计费,跟客户利益对齐,按席位没道理;他判断2030年代会走向按结果付费。他描述了一个准市场形态:买方是要完成任务的工程师,模型厂按任务报价竞标,报高了亏本,报低了没利润,成败由验证闭环判定。任务怎么切分还是难题,但工具越强,切分越容易。

黑灯工厂:把公司当一个 AGI 来调参

公司名字的来历也交代了。灵感之一是特斯拉工厂,机械臂满场跑,马斯克说工厂是「建造机器的机器」。终极形态叫「黑灯工厂」:灯全关着,生产照常进行。Factory 押注软件开发正在走向这个形态。

马坦对现状的判断很刻薄也很准确:每家公司其实都已经有一个软件工厂,只不过极其低效,像前工业时代的手工缝纫。一家万人以上的公司,一个功能从决策到发布,流程里牵扯几百甚至上千人,而且大概率没人能把这条流程画出来。靠的是「去问那个干了30年的老师傅」、层层审批、某份没人记得的检查清单,全是部落知识和人工冗余。

他引用了杰克·多西(Jack Dorsey)的一篇博客:每家公司都像一个 AGI。既然是 AGI,就该优化权重,搞清楚哪些节点承重、哪些节点该加 token、哪里该加节点。训模型不能靠感觉做反向传播,得真跑数字。现实里的公司呢?token 预算靠拍脑袋,裁员两万人也靠拍脑袋。不可能有什么科学能论证两万这个数字,那就是先砍一刀看看。

往后推两年,CIO 要回答的问题会从「每个增量 token 给谁」变成「每个增量美元给谁」:加人头还是加 token?加到哪个部门?销售团队加 token 大概率没用,好销售的价值在跟客户面对面坐下来的那段时间;工程团队加 token,产出实打实涨。这些判断需要数据闭环:功能上线,留存动没动,使用量动没动。马坦说,十年后回头看现在这个软件时代,会像看到不做记账的远古生意。帕特补了一句:像《广告狂人》里的营销,全凭创意,没人知道什么真的有效。

由此是核心竞争力的重新排布。马坦见过反例:一家消费物流公司坚持自研软件开发智能体,半年后想明白了,核心竞争力是物流,雇 AI 工程师干这个纯属浪费。类比很简单:互联网早期,开披萨店得先雇程序员做网站;今天没有披萨店设工程部门,也没人觉得可惜。AI 会逼所有企业做一次冷酷的聚焦:核心的事加倍下注,其余的外购。

对未来的预测,他给了一个具体数字:12到24个月内,90% 的 token 会是异步的。现在的 Claude Code 用量看着凶猛,但全是同步的,工程师哪天集体病倒,用量直接归零。真正的智能体原生时代,是 droid 自己在后台跑:发现一条客户信号,自己动手修,或者先出个初版方案。灯关着,活照干。

他也泼了冷水:短期会有剧烈动荡,很多公司错配了资源,组织虚胖,纠正的过程会非常痛,他认为每个 AI 公司的 CEO 都该为此承担比现在更多的责任。长期他完全不信「工程师要消失」。世界上问题很多,一大类可以用软件解决,真正被软件解决的只是一小部分。被释放出来的工程师,会流向那些从没被解决的问题,从政府网站这种糟糕体验,到制药研发这种长期缺软件人才的领域。他给行业的期许是,这个重新分配别花十年,争取六个月到一年。

明天就能用的五件事

聊到客户怎么完成这场转型,马坦给的答案朴素得意外。表现最好的客户,做的往往是同一件事:全公司黑客马拉松。划出一天,所有人放下手头工作,就用 AI 造东西,造出来一塌糊涂也没关系,重点是定下基调。EY 是他们最大的客户之一,算不上 AI 前沿公司,态度却很明确:之前的转型迟到过,这次不迟到了,搞砸就搞砸,先跑起来。

另外两条分野:敢喊「没有圣牛」,把现有流程整个推倒试新方案,不行再放回去;变革由内部发起,来自技术团队和一线,比董事会空降的指令成功率高得多。

最后是可以直接抄的清单:

  • 考核输出,别考核输入。别统计团队「用没用 AI」,去统计 AI 参与的工作有没有真的改善留存、使用量这些结果指标。
  • 给每个增量美元做分配决策:加人头还是加 token,加到哪个团队。销售加 token 基本无效,工程加 token 回报明显,先从这两个极端校准。
  • 别把命运押在单一模型上。按任务路由,写代码、测试、复查可以分属不同模型,COBOL 这类老系统试试微调专用模型。
  • 写验证标准时往死里严格。智能体为了通过测试,是会把代码整个删掉的,「问题解决了,因为代码没了」。
  • 如果团队还没动起来,先办一天全公司黑客马拉松,允许失败,别设圣牛。
文稿来源:sequoiacap.com;机器转写可能有识别错误,人名与数字请以音频为准。
id="podcast-transcript" data-framer-component-type="RichTextContainer" style="transform:none"> IntroMatan Grinberg: Bezos at Amazon, it’s customer obsession. But in our mind, that’s an input metric. You don’t want to measure input metrics. It doesn’t matter if you’re customer obsessed. You could be customer obsessed and they file a restraining order against you because they don’t like what it is that you’re doing. Our job is to build something so good that our customers themselves become obsessed with us. That is our job. The analogy is if you’re a coach of a basketball team, you don’t want to tell your players before they come out there, “Hey guys, make sure to sweat.” It’s like, what? No, score points. We need to score points. And in doing so yeah, you’re probably going to sweat. And I think similarly, to create obsessed customers, you probably need to be really obsessed yourself with the customers, but the output is what matters. Main conversationPat Grady: We’re here in the studio with Matan from Factory. This is our second time with Matan. Matan Grinberg: Yes, indeed. Thanks for having me. Pat Grady: You’re in the small and elite group of second-time Training Data attendees, so thank you. Matan Grinberg: Oh yeah. Pat Grady: Matan is the co-founder and CEO of Factory, which makes droids, which are autonomous agents for the art of software development. Matan Grinberg: Yes, indeed. Pat Grady: And Matan, we’re going to jump right in because I think you guys are a little bit of a dark horse candidate in this world of software development. It is a market that has absolutely taken off. There are folks like Claude Code and Cognition and others who have a lead, but you guys are coming up strong. Talk about the competitive dynamics and what makes Factory special. Matan Grinberg: It’s been a wild ride. We started Factory three and a half years ago now. So in April of 2023, when the world—and the enterprise in particular—was barely ready for GitHub Copilot, let alone fully autonomous agents. And so I think the first two years, it was kind of our journey in the desert is how I like to refer to it, because we were focused on fully autonomous agents, but engineers weren’t ready, procurement teams at the enterprise weren’t ready. And so I think retrospectively, we really honed our craft and learned a lot about how to build for developers in the enterprise. But it took a lot of time to actually come around to when they were ready to receive it. And so we’re kind of now emerging much more, and some of these other players like Anthropic or OpenAI who have a ton of distribution are going in and bringing their incredible tools like Claude Code or Codex. The thing that enterprises are really caring about that we have learned through those two years is they do not want anyone to kind of be their single point of failure. They do not want anyone to kind of control their fate. And so something that really matters is model independence. Everyone learned from cloud where, back in the cloud days, it was like AWS or Azure being like, “Hey, come on in, sign this three-year contract. It’s going to be so cheap. We’re going to subsidize it. It’ll be great.” And then a couple of years later, when it came time to renewal, they would 10x the contract. Pat Grady: [laughs] Data gravity, we got you now. Matan Grinberg: Yeah, we got you. What are you going to do, a two-year migration to go to someone else? No way. Everyone has scars from that now. And so everyone knows, look, Claude Code is fantastic. Codex from OpenAI is fantastic. We cannot put our fate in any one of these model providers’ hands. Also, if you just look at the risk profiles of the model labs versus the cloud providers, what’s the last piece of drama that came out of one of the cloud providers? Versus the model labs, it seems like there’s always some sort of chaos of internal fighting or getting in spats with the government or any other entities. And so if you’re going to build this very important part of your business, you want to make sure that you’re robust to any of these changes. And that’s something that we’ve learned over those kind of initial two years is, developers really care about things being modular. They want to know that they can customize it to what they want. They want to know that if there’s a new model that comes out that’s faster or cheaper or more performant, they can kind of hot swap it in. And that’s, I think, one of the biggest reasons why a lot of the largest enterprises are taking the momentum that they’ve had from a Codex or a Claude Code and then are carrying that into Factory, because they get that performance from these fantastic models, but they do it without the vendor lock-in that the model labs directly would provide. Pat Grady: And if I’m the enterprise, I’m going to be like, “Wait a minute, am I now just getting locked into Factory?” What’s the answer to that? Matan Grinberg: It’s a really good question, because that is something that you might think of, like, okay, wait, so we’re just switching the lock-in point. All of the modularity that we build is such that if at some point you wanted to say, hey, you know what, Factory’s not staying at the frontier anymore, whether it’s the automations that you build or the skills registry that we help you create, the work that we’ve done stays in your codebase, and any of the automations that we’ve created, the artifacts also live in your codebase. In other words, there aren’t really things that we’re saying are tribal knowledge about your org that we’re keeping on our side and not giving to you. And that’s part of the relationship that we have with customers is that we similarly want to make sure we’re providing the best experience possible. If we help you arbitrage between different models to get cost optimization, we’re giving you that optimization. We’re not taking that away from you. And I think that’s a really important part of the trust that we’re building with these enterprises. Pat Grady: You and I were talking probably a couple months ago at this point, and I was trying to give you credit for having the right vision for this market two, three years ago. And you responded with something along the lines of, “Thank you, but being two or three years early is the same as being wrong.” Matan Grinberg: Yes. Pat Grady: Which I thought was a wonderful response in so many ways. Can you talk about, like, those two years in the desert, how did it feel to have this vision that turned out to be right, that nobody appreciated for a year or two? Can you just talk about that journey and what it has done to the DNA of your company? Matan Grinberg: Yeah. I mean, in the moment, it’s really, really difficult because I hadn’t had a job before. I dropped out of my PhD to start this company, and over the course of those two years, convinced 20 of the smartest people that I’ve ever met to quit what it was that they were doing and join Factory and join us on this mission. And these are people with families, these are people with kids who are dedicating years of their lives to this problem and going customer after customer. And they weren’t ready for agents. They didn’t get it. Also, the models weren’t as performant, but I think a lot of it was behavioral. And I mean, even just a fun anecdote of, like, giving developers an NPS survey. If you ever are giving a developer an NPS survey, they do not like whatever it is that you’re giving it to them, because developers, they vote with their feet. They are very clear what they like and what they don’t like. And if you’re like, hmm, I wonder if they like it, they definitely don’t. Pat Grady: [laughs] Matan Grinberg: But during that time, I think there was a lot that we were learning. There was a lot that I myself was like—I’d never had a job before. Enterprise sales is not something that comes obvious to a physicist. But at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter. There’s no—you don’t get any bonus points for being early, because who cares? There’s no consolation prize. It’s either you do the thing or you don’t do the thing. And that’s all that matters. And for the team, it was really tough. There were points where we ended up getting good at enterprise sales, but the product still wasn’t good. And that’s a very tricky position to be in, because we ended up getting to a point where we were, like, just under $2 million in revenue and the product was not good. And there was a point in time where we realized this. Because if you’re really good at sales, you can sign contracts. You can definitely do that. But if you’re doing that and the developers don’t like your product, it’s like a ticking time bomb, because eventually they’re going to churn and it’s going to be really, really bad. We realized this, and we proactively gave all of those customers their money back. And I remember that was one of the most difficult decisions to make, because not only is there a group of 20 people who are getting ridiculous offers from all the labs, they have these huge financial incentives to go elsewhere. There are all these other companies that are doing well, and they decided to do this. And then we’re going to say, “Oh yeah. Hey, by the way, that little bit of revenue we managed to get, we’re actually going to give it back because we don’t think product is making their developers happy.” Pat Grady: Why did you make that decision? Matan Grinberg: We sold them on a good vision and convinced them that this is the right team to work with and that we were going to deliver the solution for them. But we realized that the way that we had sold them on it and the product that we were delivering was not up to snuff in a way that I don’t think it would hold true to one of our operating principles. And one of our operating principles that I really like is create obsessed customers. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: This kind of flips over Bezos’s thing, where Bezos at Amazon, it’s customer obsession. But in our mind, that’s an input metric. And input metrics? You don’t want to measure input metrics. It doesn’t matter if you’re customer obsessed. You could be customer obsessed and they file a restraining order against you because they don’t like what it is that you’re doing. Our job is to build something so good that our customers themselves become obsessed with us. That is our job. The analogy is if you’re a coach of a basketball team, you don’t want to tell your players before they come out there, “Hey guys, make sure to sweat.” It’s like, what? No, score points. We need to score points. And in doing so, yeah, you’re probably going to sweat. And I think similarly to create obsessed customers, you probably need to be really obsessed yourself with the customers, but the output is what matters. And I think, coming back to this, the product that we were delivering was not creating obsessed customers. And we wanted to make sure—like, this was a group of the smartest people I’ve ever met. We were getting there. We were getting a lot of intuition. Things were starting to come together internally. We could see internally we were starting to become a lot more agent-native in how we were doing things, and the product was kind of scratching that itch. But we were kind of ahead of our customers, and we wanted to maintain trust with our customers so that when it does hit, we can come back to them and say, “Hey guys, this is the real deal, I promise.” And to build that credibility, we had to say, “Hey, look, even though you were maybe happy to continue, we’re going to give you this back and say, three months from now, I think it’ll be ready. Give us some time and I promise we will knock your socks off.” Pat Grady: How did your customers react when you had that conversation? Matan Grinberg: Some of them were like, “Oh great, sounds good,” because I think it wasn’t something that they were obsessed with. Some of them were a little bit confused, but I think generally, especially enterprises, they’re not used to these things. A lot of times, an enterprise’s budget, once it’s gone, it’s gone, and no one really cares. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: And so some of them didn’t even know if they had a mechanism by which to take back the money. Pat Grady: [laughs] Matan Grinberg: But it’s a difficult thing to tell investors who believe in you, too. I remember having the conversation with Shaun. I think Shaun, obviously, he’s stayed really close with the company, so he was very much on the same page. But it’s kind of a scary thing to be like, “Hey, by the way, remember all those updates where you’re saying, ‘Hey, look, the revenue is going up?’ It’s about to go down to zero.” It was a scary thing. And I think it was kind of a leap of faith of, like, we see the signal internally early that this is the direction we need to go. We need to kind of pivot the approach on the product. But I remember that all-hands where we told the whole team, that was like one of the worst months of my life. Not everyone was going to say, like, “What the hell is this? What’s going on?” But it’s kind of the looks on their faces where they kind of go a little bit pale and they’re like, oh boy, is this just the early signs and we’re about to sink completely? Pat Grady: How’d you keep the team together through that? Matan Grinberg: I think honestly, the only reason the team stayed together is we were so ruthless about hiring early on where it was like, people that are genuinely really, really obsessed with the mission, which our mission is to bring autonomy to software engineering. And, like, really, really caring about that, making sure everyone was also—like, very clear feedback loops as to the fate is in our hands. It’s not like this is like, oh, something that I go do. It’s like we all have a part to play in making this work. And I think embracing how much it sucked was also, I think, something that was very valuable. Pat Grady: Just being honest about it. Matan Grinberg: Being super honest about, like, yeah, this sucks. Look at those competitors, their revenue is going up like crazy. This is not good. We are in a very bad position. We just had to give back all of our revenue. We need to really get our shit together. And in the moment, I think, retrospectively, those are the moments where really the deepest bonds are made. If you talk to people who are athletes or even academics or whatever, whenever you’re in the stressful period, whether it’s cramming before finals or—we have some rowers on our team, and I think that’s an example we always go to. Pat Grady: That’s a pure pain sport. Matan Grinberg: It’s pain. It’s literally just—there is one number that quantifies your performance. It’s just, what is your time on your 2K, or your time in—but embracing that is what creates those enduring bonds, such that afterwards we know what it’s like to be at rock bottom. We know what it’s like to lose. I mean, when we first started the company, our valuation was $5 million. A lot of our competitors, a lot of the companies out there these days, they don’t know what it’s like to not be a unicorn. That’s manifestly what they are day one. Whereas we have been there kind of in those dark moments, and not a single person left. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: That makes us so resilient and so strong that going forward, things are going a lot better now, but there are going to be really bad times. But we have that resiliency in our DNA that I’m not sure some of these other companies do. Sonya Huang: I love that. So talk to us about what changed. And I’m curious about your comment from earlier that the models getting better is not the most important thing that happens, because at least in my mind, the models getting better is the most important thing that happens. So just help me understand. Matan Grinberg: Yeah, so a couple things. So one is the interaction pattern that we were building for before was too ambitious. To your point, we were right in that what we were building for was fully autonomous agents, but it was two years too early, which makes it wrong. And fully autonomous agents require a complete change in behavior from the developer. And we were trying to do that out of the box before they were even using tools like Copilot. It was just too much of a leap. It was too much of a step-function jump. So it’s an important day—September 26, 2025 was when we first put out basically the Droid CLI. And the Droid CLI met developers where they were in a manner that previously these fully autonomous agents did not. And also its performance was completely state of the art, and it was model-agnostic, so it could use every model that was out there. September 26 was also two years after we initially started. So the world had gotten much more used to using things like autocomplete. By late 2025, most engineers were using an autocomplete tool, and many were starting to, at the time, use a chat interface to ask an agent to go do changes wholesale, so the more agentic interaction. However, what we see is that if you go back now and use this agentic interaction, some of these older models are still good. So the biggest thing that changed was developers, and in particular in the enterprise, being open-minded to this new way of working. In particular, developers, they’ve established their workflows over the last 30 years. They can be stubborn. A lot of them were like, “No, no, no. My craft could never be done by an AI tool.” So a lot of it was just understanding how to work with these tools and having the willingness to go in and try, and also the intuition about what are the guardrails that you need to provide in order for it to succeed. Sonya Huang: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: And so I think it was a combination of both of these things. The model’s getting better, so you need to do less in the way of providing guardrails, but also developers lowering their guard and being like, okay, you know what? Let me go try and do these things. It’s going to go do things I don’t like. And then also, there’s a certain degree to which when Andrej Karpathy tweets about something, then every engineer suddenly is like, okay, maybe this is true. And Andrej started to tweet about this agentic work—early on, he wasn’t as open to it. And then him being more open to it genuinely just changed some people’s minds. Which is funny, but that’s some of the things that go into behavior changes. You hear it from people you trust. You start seeing it from people within your organization who are maybe a little bit more agent-native. But these things together is kind of what changed that. Sonya Huang: And now we’re all going to be on Slack. [laughs] Matan Grinberg: We might, we might be on Slack. We might be pushing the limits of Slack, which I think is going to be another interesting thing. Sonya Huang: That’s cool. That’s cool. Okay, so September 2025, you launched the Droid CLI. You said “frontier performance soda.” What does that mean for you? Matan Grinberg: There’s the benchmarks, which have a very short half-life. Anytime there’s a good benchmark, it gets benchmaxed within, like, three to six months. Sonya Huang: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: At the time, I think the one that we kind of championed when we launched, and it ended up becoming a pretty good benchmark, was Terminal-Bench. Prior to that, the one that was kind of leading was SWE-bench, which kind of took some open-source projects and some examples of issues that were then solved. The problem with that was it was very focused on Python and scripting or individual file changes, whereas Terminal-Bench was more—one, it was in the terminal setting, so it was things like scheduling runs and things that were not just changing the code file, but general software development tasks. And that was something that we ended up having really frontier performance on. Now it’s benchmaxed to the extreme, to where I think models that come out now are like 90 percent on it. And I think there’s a very short time horizon from putting out a good benchmark to then it being kind of in the training data. Sonya Huang: What goes into building a great harness? It seems like there’s almost a lot of FUD in the ecosystem of my harness is better than your harness, and you need to own the model to have a good harness, or actually you have a better harness if you don’t own the model. What’s your mental model for—benchmark maxing aside, what keeps you at the frontier? Matan Grinberg: Yeah, so some general things that matter are the way you do caching. So cached tokens end up being like a tenth as expensive, and so one big piece of performance for a given harness is what is your rate of token caching? Another example would be how do you perform while in compression or compaction? So typically, when you’re dealing with a long session, you’re going to exceed the context limit of the model itself. And so the harness will do some sort of summarization, compression, compaction, whatever you want to call it. And the way that you perform during that compaction is a big determining factor of how good your harness is. And tests that they do for that, they call it needle in the haystack, where you have some long thread and maybe there’s one piece of information that’s really important. How often will your harness preserve that through compaction? Other examples are tool use, or how does it use the environment to validate whatever work that it’s doing? These are things that you can kind of have individual metrics on and that we kind of have our own internal benchmarks to measure how do the out-of-the-box agents do versus how does Factory perform. I think one thing that naively everyone believed initially was if you train the model and you build the harness, you’re going to make them better together. Sonya Huang: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: And much to the chagrin of many of my friends at OpenAI and Anthropic, this is not true. If you build a harness that supports different models, that harness will be better. Sonya Huang: My intuition would be model harness co-design makes you better. Matan Grinberg: Yes. Sonya Huang: What’s the intuition for why it’s actually not? Matan Grinberg: It’s very analogous to the idea maybe, I don’t know, 10 years ago, back in ML days before GPT-3, “I want to train my personal AI, I’m going to give it all of my data, because I want it to know me.” Turns out the answer was: train it on the whole internet, and it’ll be so much better for you than if it were just trained on your data. So there’s a sort of analog that emerges where it’s what data is to a model, models are to a harness. Where the more models you expose to a harness, you avoid overfitting that harness to the nuances of that model in particular. And there are certain intricacies about different models that you can learn from and then improve different models’ performance in your own harness. And this was why, for example, we kind of stopped doing it, because Terminal-Bench got so benchmaxed. But initially, when every new Opus or GPT model would come out, it would perform better on Terminal-Bench in Droid than it would in Claude Code or Codex. And this is something that I think was somewhat frustrating, because from a lab perspective, you ideally want it so that it’s better together, because then that means you have to use their harness and you can’t use a different one. But I think the reality is having that multimodal harness ends up getting kind of frontier on all of those aspects. Pat Grady: Is there a good example or illustration of that? Conceptually, it makes sense. Is there an easy way to illustrate it? Matan Grinberg: Maybe a good example of it is like, if you’re familiar with the different behaviors of Opus and GPT-5.6 right now. Sonya Huang: I am. He’s not. [laughs] Pat Grady: [laughs] Matan Grinberg: I mean, loosely, loosely—I mean, to be fair, honestly, these days I’m not doing it as much either, but I will say loosely, Opus is kind of like that super friendly colleague where you’re like, “Hey, I want to go do these 20 tasks,” and they’re like, “Okay, cool. Hey, by the way, five of those tasks, I realized we didn’t need to do. Don’t worry about it. I got other of these done, did it this way.” Sonya Huang: They’ll be like, “Tonight’s not a good time. Let’s pick it up in the morning.” Matan Grinberg: Yeah. And let’s go get a beer afterwards and hang out, whatever. Meanwhile, GPT-5.6 is like, “Absolutely, I will do every single one of those and nothing will stop me. I’m not going to sleep until there’s—” it’s kind of very OCD and meticulous. But sometimes you want one where it actually realizes hey, that list of 20 that you gave me, actually, here’s a better way of doing it anyway. 5.6 is more methodical. If you build a harness for each of those, there are actually different things that that harness will then be good or bad at. So for example, one thing that typically agents will do is they’ll have a to-do list of, like, if you have a task, it’ll go and generate a to-do list. And the Claude Code harness can, in some cases—and this is maybe less relevant now, but I think earlier, this is just a more illustrative example—earlier it was really strict to make sure it would stick to the to-do list, because the model itself would typically wander. Meanwhile, Codex wouldn’t do that because the model itself was really, really OCD about that. Sonya Huang: That’s right. Matan Grinberg: But if you’re a user, you want to have the same experience regardless. You want to make sure if you switch to a different model, you’re not going to suddenly lose track of whatever things that you are working on. And so there are certain things where, like, maybe in some cases you really want robust tool use—and there are tools that you use to do these to-do lists. You want really robust tool use, and you want to make sure that no matter what, if I’m a user, I want to see my to-do list there. There were some cases where it would just not have the to-do list. And so these are things that kind of improve the general performance. And the to-do list matters because if you’re doing some crazy migration and you don’t have the to-do list, and then you’re in this long session where there’s compaction, that might get lost in the summarization. And then now you forgot what your seventh step was, and that could be one of the failure modes. That’s kind of an example of how … Pat Grady: That’s a good example. Yeah. Yeah. Sonya Huang: That’s a great example. Okay, so we talked about one type of maxing, benchmark maxing. Let’s talk about token maxing. Matan Grinberg: Yes. Sonya Huang: Because it feels like the world has changed a lot. We’ve gone from token maxing to now cost rationalization. What does that mean for Factory? Matan Grinberg: Yeah, so maybe I’ll lay this out just so we’re all on the same page of, like, the way that we see what’s led us to this token maxing. So loosely, there was this phase one where—maybe phase zero was no one believed in AI. Then phase one, everyone believes in AI. And then boards were like, “Mr. CEO, what are you doing about AI? What’s your AI strategy?” And Mr. CEO was like, “Shit, I don’t know. What’s our AI strategy? CTO, make sure everyone goes and uses AI.” And so then phase two is, CTO is like, “Okay, shit, we gotta make sure everyone uses AI. Let’s start putting it in performance reviews. Let’s make public rankings of who’s using tokens the most, because everyone’s stubborn. No one wants to use this stuff. They’re all skeptical.” And then we enter phase three, which is everyone sees these ratings, they see that it’s part of their perf reviews, and they’re like, “Okay, I’m going to use AI for everything.” And that’s kind of phase three. It’s this token maxing, where people are using Opus for literally everything. “What’s the weather in SF? Opus, tell me. I don’t know.” Pat Grady: [laughs] Matan Grinberg: There are banks that we are working with where they are spending literally hundreds of thousands of dollars a month on people asking things like literally, what is the weather? Or, like, tell me about Python. Trivial questions that you could Google, people are asking Opus. And the reality is this happened because we were so worried about adoption that we overcorrected and we’re like, adoption by any means necessary. And I think that’s actually a decent approach. It’s probably faster to do that and then curb usage or make usage more responsible than it is to start limited and be like, you can only use it for this thing, because when you have people that are stubborn, first you want to just prove that it works and then you can get kind of more mature about it. Where Factory fits in, I think one of the most important things that we do is that we have the Factory Router, which allows you to dynamically route to different models based on the task that you’re doing. So if you’re asking what the weather is, you probably don’t need the very frontier of human intelligence to answer that for you. Sonya Huang: Or you really do. Matan Grinberg: I mean, it depends. I don’t know, it depends on what kind of answer you’re looking for—giving you a full, down-to-the-molecular-level answer of what’s happening. Allowing that, but also more importantly, for every enterprise, something that no one’s dealing with yet, but 12 months from now is going to be the case, is not everyone needs the same tokens. Having a blanket kind of token cap for every individual in some large bank, let’s say, makes no sense. So every CIO is going to need to answer for every incremental token, where do we put it? And right now, it is super not obvious how you would do that. Right now we’re saying, oh, the PMs who are vibe-coding dashboards get the same token limits as the engineers who are building critical infrastructure. That’s probably not the best thing to do. Or similarly, you might be dealing with COBOL codebases where Opus is not the best model to use, but instead maybe some fine-tuned model on that codebase in particular. The point of the router is that we can kind of accommodate these different constraints where maybe you say, you know what, this part of the org, they’re just vibe-coding. They can use Gemini Flash. This part of the org, they’re doing COBOL. We fine-tuned this great model to work on COBOL. Let’s route to that when we’re working on that part of the codebase. Maybe this other part, we really care about reliability, so let’s generate the code with OpenAI, test it with Anthropic, review it with Gemini, things like that. And we can actually take in your routing procedure instructions in natural language, so you could even say things—like, it’s not purely deterministic, it can even be, “Pat, I don’t know what he’s doing.” Sonya Huang: Give Pat Gemini Flash. Pat Grady: Come on! Matan Grinberg: I think we really need to avoid having them use open models because, whatever the reason, we don’t like the way open models perform here. And we’ll do internal benchmarking to know which models are better at which of these tasks. Sonya Huang: How close are the open models at this point? Which one’s the best? Matan Grinberg: GLM 5.2 is incredible. It’s at the point where internally we have no token limits for our engineers, and half of our tokens are open to open models. Pat Grady: Wow! Matan Grinberg: Yeah, because they’re just faster and they’re cheaper. They’re just as performant. And I think the thing that everyone gets wrong is everyone is comparing GLM 5.2 to the latest model, like Opus 4.8 or GPT-5.6, but really they should be compared to Opus 4.7 or GPT-5.5. Sonya Huang: Why? Matan Grinberg: Because generally the open models come later, and they’re kind of a generation behind. And that’s kind of—like, the frontier models will be frontier. The question is: Are the open models getting as good as, like, frontier minus one? And the answer is unequivocally yes, which I think is a really, really interesting outcome. It’s great for consumers—and by consumers, I don’t mean individuals, I mean the consumers of the APIs, because if you’re a business that is doing software engineering, your job is, at a very high level, to solve problems. And if we can allow you to solve those problems faster and with cheaper models that are just as performant, that means you can solve more problems. That is a good thing. And it is a very good world where there is not a monopoly on intelligence, but instead kind of a garden of intelligence that you can pick and choose when you’d like. Something that we joke about is, like, on this intelligence allocation thing, if you’re trying to get a tutor for your daughter in algebra, you can probably find someone cheaper than Albert Einstein to be that tutor. Now it might be that she eventually goes and becomes a leading physicist or something, in which case, yeah, maybe let’s get Albert Einstein in there. But most likely, you can get a high school student or something like that. And it’s probably much more cost-effective for you as well to do so. Pat Grady: Since you guys do the model routing, if there’s a pie chart that shows the complexion of models being used by your customer base today, what did it look like a few months ago? What does it look like today? What do you think it’ll look like in a year? Matan Grinberg: Yeah, I will caveat this with saying that right now enterprises haven’t gone too opinionated yet into the routing procedures. Pat Grady: Okay. Matan Grinberg: This is something that will happen over the next six to twelve months. But right now they’re just going from no router to router. That’s kind of the first change. Then it’s going to be the exact nature of the routing. At the beginning of the year, it was less than one percent of tokens that went to open models. In the first quarter, it became a single-digit percent. It has now crossed into being a double-digit percent of tokens. Now percent of tokens is not always the same as percent of cost, because the open tokens are cheaper, but it is pretty crazy to see the growth there. Sonya Huang: What’s your forecast? Matan Grinberg: My sense is that we will asymptote towards the vast majority being open, just because it provides you more optionality and it’s cheaper. But that’s of token share, not necessarily of leverage share, because maybe there’s one percent of tokens that are incredibly, incredibly valuable and are very key decision-making. And then the rest are more like implementation tokens, or kind of lower stakes, if you will. I don’t think there’s going to be a world in which it’s ever going to be 100 percent. Sonya Huang: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: I think the frontier of intelligence will inherently always be valuable for every business, just because the stakes are going to get higher and the kind of intricacy with which you think is going to be more important, but we’ll be better at offloading certain tasks. And you can loosely think of this already with the way orgs are structured, where in general, engineering leaders are more tenured engineers who in theory have more wisdom, and each minute of their brainpower is higher leverage, in theory. And you can also imagine, like, consider a human engineer, and try mapping over the course of their day how much brainpower they’re using. It’s probably going to be really low for a lot of it, but then there are going to be some moments where they’re going pretty high. They’re deeply concentrating and thinking about some systems design problem or whatever. All of those low-leverage moments, we want to automate away. And those very high-leverage moments—sometimes we’re referring to them as the eureka moments, or the moments where they’re doing something that’s very high leverage, what if those aren’t just moments, but what if those are hours at a time? Because you don’t have to deal with all the other stuff. And I think that’s kind of the way to think about intelligence allocation is if you’re an engineer and you’re writing docs, that is such a low-leverage use of your time. You’ve become an expert in your craft, and you spend hours writing docs. I remember it was actually valuable. I remember Stripe had so much alpha for just having incredible docs. But imagine all the other stuff those incredible engineers could do if it wasn’t writing documentation. We should live in a world where everyone can have docs as good as Stripe, and that is strictly beneficial for everyone. And then the question is okay, what do those really smart engineers do with their time once they don’t have to do that? Sonya Huang: Maybe this is a good time to talk about business model, given that, especially with the rise of open-weight models, the cost differential—I imagine that means very different things for your cost structure, but very similar value delivered to customers. How do you think about business model and pricing? Matan Grinberg: Yeah, this is more what our customers want and need, as opposed to what we want and need. So for example, I think right now usage-based is clearly the way to go. We want to be aligned with what they are doing and what we are doing. I think seat-based doesn’t make sense, at least for what we are doing. My sense is that eventually we will change to outcome-based. Now I don’t think the enterprise is ready for that—and we’ve learned our lesson from those first two years, we are not going to impose things, right? But my suspicion is that in the 2030s, things will probably look more outcome-based. Sonya Huang: Yeah. Pat Grady: What does outcome-based mean for your market? What would be the definition of an outcome? Matan Grinberg: So maybe here’s a way to put it. Right now we are usage-based: the more tokens you use, the more you pay, the more we get. Now since we are model-independent, with our router, we are kind of pointing a token cannon at either OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GCP, you know, any one of these people. To a certain degree, this is like a really dumbed-down version of a marketplace, where right now the buy side is an engineer who wants a task done. And then you have the model providers who are saying, either in benchmarks right now, they’re like, we perform at this cost and this performance, and then we determine who we go to for that given task. There’s a world in which, if it’s so important to get these tokens, they might kind of bid in a certain way, saying, look, here is our cost for this task. We will get this task done at this cost, no matter what. But they’re pricing it such that they hope that they can make a margin there. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: If they price it wrong, they’re at a negative margin. If they price it right and win the bid, then they get the positive margin. And the way you determine if the task was successful is by some validation loops, because no one is using these tools anymore where it’s just like, “Write me code. Great, thank you.” It’s generally, “Write me code, and here’s how I know it was done well.” And similarly, if you are a model lab and you are given, “Here’s a task, here’s the validation criteria,” you’ll be able to say roughly how much you think you would be willing to pay to get those tokens. And you want to have some margin on that. And then in that world, that’s basically—that’s a way that you kind of dynamically shift from usage-based to outcome-based. I think that there are so many questions with this—and this is very much forward-looking, but I think there’s a lot of questions about how do you subdivide tasks. Divvying that up, I think, is something that’s not obvious. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: But as these tools get better, doing things like that actually become way easier. Pat Grady: Yeah, that’s fascinating. Yeah, if you can scope a task and then create a competitive marketplace, that’d be a fascinating version of the future. Matan Grinberg: Yes. And as a user, it then creates an incentive to be very thorough in your validation criteria. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: Because there are stories where you ask an agent to fix your code and it deletes your code. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: It’s like the solution is just get rid of it all. Sonya Huang: It’s like that Silicon Valley episode. You can see how prescient it was. Matan Grinberg: Yeah, so you need to make sure your tests are very thorough, because technically it could hit all of your validation criteria. Sonya Huang: Or the son of Anton will go rogue. Matan Grinberg: Yeah, exactly. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: Yeah. Good reference. Sonya Huang: Maybe zooming out a little bit. You named the company Factory—actually, you named it Droid before Factory. Matan Grinberg: That’s right. Sonya Huang: But you named it Factory before this concept took off, and now it feels like everybody wants to build a software factory. Where do you think we are today in terms of the building of software factories, and how close are we to the ultimate vision of a software factory? Matan Grinberg: Yeah, everyone has a software factory, whether they know it or not. It’s just a very inefficient one. It feels like pre-industrialization, where people were manually sewing things together, or woodworking, or whatever it might be. And these things are very inefficient. Right now, if you go to an organization that has more than 10,000 people and you were to ask about the process by which they decide and release a feature, there is hundreds or maybe thousands of people in that process, and most likely they couldn’t even draw it for you. There’s a very low likelihood that they would know what that process looks like. That is not because they think that is the right way of doing things. That is just kind of the nature of building large software as it is today. But with these systems, so much tribal knowledge can be codified. So much of this stuff that typically would require, oh, we need to ask this guru who’s been here for 30 years who has the wisdom. Oh, we then need this approval and that approval. Oh, and I forgot there was some doc that said we always have to do this checklist. And it relies so much on human behavior and redundancy. So much of that can be automated and refocused on what actually moves the needle for our business. And I think this move towards software factories is a move towards figuring out what are the actual inputs that determine what features we need to build. And that might be inputs from the customers, inputs from the market, inputs from product leaders at the company. And let’s be very clear, these are the signals, the inputs that we are taking in here. Okay, great, we have those signals. Then what is the process by which we build this? And really mapping out the assembly lines of how you are building software is really important, because then you get to close the loop and say, did this actually deliver an outcome for our business? Talking before about the tokenomics, if you’re that CIO and you’re faced with that question of where do you put every incremental token, really, the question two years from now is going to become, where do you put every incremental dollar? And so you’re going to have to be asked: do you put that incremental dollar towards headcount or towards tokens? And if tokens, to where in the org? And these are things that you can only really know when you have these kind of feedback loops that give you examples of, like, hey, by the way, we made those decisions based on this data, and it did not matter at all. We added these new features and no one cared. It didn’t create more retention, it didn’t create more usage or whatever metrics that business is looking to optimize. And the only way to do this is you need kind of more rigor and more process. It almost feels like 10 years from now we’re going to look back at this previous era of software and it’s going to feel like businesses in ancient times where they didn’t do accounting. Pat Grady: It’s going to be like marketing in the day of Mad Men, right? Matan Grinberg: Yes. Pat Grady: Where it’s all creative, and you have no idea what’s actually working. Matan Grinberg: It makes no sense. It’s like, “Oh yeah, let’s ship that feature. Oh, I think it went well. Yeah, I got some metrics on that.” It’s like, no, if you guys read the blog post that Jack Dorsey put out about how every company is like an AGI, there’s also this degree to which if your company is an AGI, you want to optimize the weights. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: You want to figure out what nodes are doing what things, which are load-bearing, which are not, which need more tokens, where do you need more nodes. And in order to do that, you don’t train a model by vibes—I mean, okay, actually you kind of do. Pat Grady: [laughs] Matan Grinberg: But I guess more importantly, you don’t do backprop in a model by vibes. Like, you are running those actual calculations, and you are seeing when we change this node, what happens. Now you might be making bets on how to change the model by vibes, but it’s pretty mathematical in what you were doing. Meanwhile, at companies, people are determining token budgets just by shooting from the hip. People are laying people off by shooting from the hip and just being like, oh yeah, like, 20,000. There is no way there is science to laying off 20,000 people. That is just like, here’s a chunk, let’s just see what happens. Instead, I think in these organizations, the way they can do things is much more mathematical of, like, this part of the business matters a lot and does better if we give it more tokens. It doesn’t actually matter if we give it more humans. So let’s give them more tokens. There might be other parts of the business where actually giving them more tokens doesn’t matter, but more people matter, because if we build more relationships with our customers and deeper relationships with our customers, that matters. But these are things that we’re going to need quantitative insight on. And you need a software factory to do that. Otherwise, you’re just, like, shooting from the hip and just guessing, which won’t work as well. Sonya Huang: In the limit, how much do you think people will spend on tokens versus on engineering headcount? Matan Grinberg: It’ll depend on the business. I think every business will have a balance. And it just depends on—look, an easy example is generally salespeople, they probably don’t need that many tokens if they’re good salespeople, because generally where they provide the most alpha is when they’re in the seat face-to-face with their customers, talking about the customer’s problems, understanding how they build software in our case, and how we can make that more efficient, more productive. They can use tokens a little bit of, like, generate them an AI debrief, take some notes, help them with the follow-up. But that’s so minimal, the number of tokens, it basically doesn’t matter. Like, if you add more tokens to the sales team, it probably won’t change their output. If you add more humans to the sales team, it probably will. Meanwhile, engineering teams are pretty different, where engineering teams generally, it seems like, you want people to own an outcome end to end, but then if you give them more tokens, they can produce a lot more. And then there’s a lot of places in between of, like, operations, finance, marketing. These are places that are neither here nor there, where I think they’re somewhere in between, and it kind of depends on your business. But I think every business is going to have to ask, what is our core competency? Something that we see a lot in the market—or we used to see, and now they finally kind of hit reality, but what we used to see is, oh, we’re going to build our own software development agents. And we’re like, okay, you’re a consumer logistics company, are you sure you want to do that? They’re like, yeah, yeah, yeah, we have to do this. And it’s like, okay. And then six months later, it’s like, wait, actually, this is not a core competency for our business. We don’t want to hire AI engineers to be doing this. Our core competency is consumer logistics. That’s what we want to focus on. And I think this is an opportunity for every business to double down on their core competency and what matters for them, and then procure externally whatever it is that doesn’t matter for them. Sonya Huang: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: A trivial example of this is like, I don’t know, in the days of the early internet, you probably had to be a programmer to build a website. And websites generally help if you’re a pizza shop, because people come to your pizza shop, they want to be able to order, whatever. At that time, would you say it was a core competency of a pizza shop to have engineers? Certainly not. That is kind of a byproduct of a brief moment in time. But then there were companies out there that help you build a website, you don’t need to be technical. And then this is why we live in a world where most pizza shops don’t have an engineering department, which I think is probably a good thing. And I think similarly, a lot of businesses have dealt with the reality of if you want to do XYZ other thing, you have to bring in people of this type of role. But I think that’s been something you had to do, not because it’s a core competency of the business. And allowing businesses to focus and double down on the things that they are best at, I think, is going to be good for the consumers of their business. And so I think we’re just going to see a lot of ruthless refocusing on what actually matters, which is going to be cool to see. Pat Grady: Well, on that, so every company kind of has to go through this process of reinvention. You know, 10 or 20 years ago, people talked about digital transformation, and I don’t know if anybody’s given it a buzzword now, but AI transformation, something of that sort. A couple years ago, you ran into a bunch of organizations that just weren’t ready to deal with autonomous agents. You’ve seen your customers start to change, and so the question is, when you look at your customers as they kind of go up this maturity curve and sort of reinvent themselves for the future, any good tricks or techniques that you’ve seen them use to repot themselves a bit? Matan Grinberg: Yeah. I mean, I think surprisingly, the companies that have been doing company-wide hackathons really end up doing well. It seems relatively trivial, but just setting aside a day where everyone in the workforce is just like, build shit with AI, it really sets the tone and sets the pace. Pat Grady: Sonya’s giving me a look. Sonya Huang: I tried to force him to build stuff with coding agents. It didn’t go so well. Matan Grinberg: We’ll work on it. We’ll do it after this one. Pat Grady: We gave it a great effort. Matan Grinberg: But that’s it. It’s literally just setting aside the time to do it. And even if it fails miserably, it’s fine. And also, the orgs that are okay with failing. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: It feels like there are some who are like, we need to do it exactly right. We need to make the right decision from day one. No error. You’re going to make mistakes, everyone is going to. And the orgs who are kind of leaning into it and embracing it to a certain degree, I think, are succeeding. Like, one of our largest customers is EY. EY is not necessarily known to be at the absolute frontier of AI, but I think for them, they were just like, look, this matters. There have been other transformations that we were late to. We’re not going to be late to this. We’re just going to go in. We might mess up, but—obviously, respecting the things that you’re not allowed to mess up. Pat Grady: Sure. Matan Grinberg: Put those aside. But, like, let’s go and get our engineers to mess around and build this stuff and see where it breaks and understand what they like and what they don’t like. I think that really matters a lot in the ones that we’re seeing succeed. And also the ones who are pretty bold in reinventing the processes that they’ve put in place and just saying, hey, there are no sacred cows. Let’s put this aside, try something out. If it doesn’t work, we’ll put that sacred cow right back. And I think that’s been kind of a determining factor there. And when it comes from within—if it comes from the board, probably not going to go well. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: If it comes from within, like the tech team or the ICs or the leadership, that’s when we see it go better. Sonya Huang: Do you have any predictions for the most important changes that are going to happen in your space over the next, call it, 12 months? Matan Grinberg: A lot of AI consumption is going up like crazy, and everyone’s super, super excited because the revenue’s going wild. A lot of this is synchronous usage. In other words, if everyone woke up sick tomorrow, a lot of Claude Code usage would be zero because it’s all just, “Hey, Claude Code,” or “Hey, Codex,” or “Hey, Droid.” I think in 12 to 24 months, 90 percent of tokens will be asynchronous tokens. Pat Grady: Hmm. Matan Grinberg: So these are going to be droids on their own, autonomously being like, “Hey, here’s some signal that I found from a customer. Let’s go fix it. Or let’s go create a first-pass solution to this.” And I think that is going to be where the real agent-native stuff begins, because right now we’re still kind of in copilot mode. If you’re going to an agent and say, “Hey, go do this for me,” it is more agentic because it’s not going to come back and ask you a ton. But it’s still like you are kicking it off. If you guys have ever been to Tesla’s factories, which is one of the sources of inspiration for the name, it’s just robotic arms everywhere going and doing stuff. It’s not like there are people there going and attaching the widget to the thing. And this idea of a dark factory, where the lights are off and things are just happening, that is where software development is going. That’s kind of where the name came from is like, Elon was always talking about how the factory is the machine that builds the machine. Pat Grady: Yeah. Matan Grinberg: And that’s been something that we took to heart. And I guess, also, that combined with his whole thing about how you’re destined to become the opposite of your name. And in our case, Factory becomes artisanal, which is kind of a good flip there. Pat Grady: What’s your most optimistic version of the future, both for Factory and for the world at large? Matan Grinberg: So I think short term, there’s going to be a lot of turbulence, because I think a lot of companies have misallocated resources pretty poorly. There’s been a lot of bloat. And I think the correction that’s going to happen there is going to be really painful for a lot of people. And I think that’s something that I think every AI CEO should really bear much more responsibility for than they currently are. And also figuring out ways to address and kind of ameliorate it in some way, because this is something that’s going to be very painful for a lot of people. Now, I have optimism that we can actually address that faster than we think. We just need to start now in terms of addressing that. Now the longer term, and why I think this is a good thing, is—and why I don’t believe at all the BS that people are saying of oh, engineers are going away. Generally, there is a huge number of problems in the world. A large subset of those problems can be solved with software. A small subset of those problems are currently being solved with software. And so in the short term, this means that okay, first there’s a given problem that was overallocated engineering resources. So okay, we need to reallocate those. Reallocating those is a very kind of cold way of saying some people are going to lose their jobs. But I think the thing that’s going to happen in the longer term is we need engineers. Engineers are some of the best systems thinkers and the best problem solvers. And there are so many problems that can be solved with software that are not being solved with software. And so that means that we are going to take those engineers and have them go and solve problems that previously were not being solved. That is such a net good for the world, because again, there are so many of these problems that we are not solving. And also, there’s so many problems that we are maybe solving, but with really shitty software. And this is going to enable people to solve it with incredible software. And the vision for Factory is that we are kind of the factory that allows them to go and build this incredible software to solve these different problems. And these problems range from things that are trivial like, you know, government software typically is not very good, whether it’s DMV or IRS web, all that stuff is generally a pretty poor experience. We don’t need to live like that. We can live in a world where all software is really fantastic. But also things like pharmaceutical research. So much that goes into solving diseases is not just a biology problem. A lot of it requires the best software engineers in the world. And previously, those problems haven’t allocated the right dollars to attract the best engineers. But now, because of what’s happening, I think we will be much more closely allocated to, like, these are the biggest problems, let’s get the best minds and the best problem solvers to solve that. I think it’s kind of our job as an industry to do that reallocation as quickly as possible, so it’s not ten years, but maybe like six months or a year. Sonya Huang: Wonderful. Matan, I think the clarity and consistency of your vision over time has just always been very inspiring. And then just seeing how much you’ve grown as a leader and how much Factory has grown as a company, even since the last time we did this Training Data episode, it’s truly awe-inspiring. So thank you for joining us again to share what you’re up to. Matan Grinberg: I appreciate it a lot. Thank you. Pat Grady: Thank you. <div class="framer-mcvrsd" id="

Factory started building fully autonomous coding agents in April 2023, two years before enterprises were ready. Matan Grinberg now says this is indistinguishable from being wrong. The Factory co-founder and CEO explains how the company survived its "journey in the desert," including the decision to hand nearly all of its revenue back to customers when the product wasn't making developers obsessed. Matan makes the contrarian technical case that a model-agnostic harness beats the model-and-harness co-design that labs like OpenAI and Anthropic favor, because exposing a harness to many models keeps it from overfitting to any single one. He argues open-weight models like GLM will capture the majority of tokens by staying one generation behind the frontier at a fraction of the cost, and that CIOs will soon justify every incremental token the way they justify headcount. Looking ahead, he predicts 90% of coding tokens will run asynchronously—the "dark factory" where software builds itself.

Hosted by Sonya Huang and Pat Grady, Sequoia Capital

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