No. 110·中文精读

谷歌一年砸2000亿美元建AI数据中心,负责人说10万块芯片连起来跑,每小时都有东西坏

Google's AI Infrastructure Chief, Amin Vahdat, on the Physics & Economics of Frontier AI

谷歌 AI 基础设施首席技术官谈十万级加速器集群的故障常态、为何 FLOPS 是虚荣指标,以及 TPU 首次分成 8i 与 8t 的取舍。

节目音频00:00 / 1:04:26
中文精读由 AI 基于原始访谈改写,非官方翻译,可能存在偏差或错误;表述以原节目为准。

谷歌2026年的资本开支预计超过2000亿美元,绝大部分变成混凝土、变电站、冷却塔和成排的机架。管这件事的人是 Amin Vahdat,2025年底被任命为谷歌AI基础设施负责人。他在红杉资本出品的 Training Data 播客里给了一个很硬核的数字:10万块加速器连在一起跑同步任务,可能一天坏好几次,配置特殊的时候一小时就好几次。

这句话把整场对话的基调定下来了。外界看AI数据中心,看到的是算力军备竞赛和漂亮的布线照片。真正在里面干活的人,每天处理的是长尾故障、电力和一棵光纤树。

AI数据中心和普通数据中心,差在「专用」两个字

Amin 先解释了两者的共同点,比想象中多。都是混凝土外壳、电气场、机械场、冷却系统、成排的配电,加上大量网络把算力连起来,再塞进不少存储。

区别在于规划周期。普通数据中心是25到30年的建筑投资,里面的硬件寿命大概六年,一栋楼要装下四五代硬件。所以设计时追求通用和可替换,什么东西都能往里塞。

AI数据中心更像定制品。建筑和要放进去的硬件一起设计,甚至会明确说这栋楼不放太多存储。原因是功率密度差得太远:一个存储机架10到40千瓦,旁边一个CPU或GPU机架轻松几百千瓦,业内已经在讨论两年内做到兆瓦级。一条通道里放30个存储机架,和放一两个AI机架,建筑形态、配电方式、网络带宽完全是两套东西。

如果把楼盖得太通用,结果往往是盖得过大、过度建设,为了30年的灵活性付出代价。AI数据中心的选择是牺牲通用性,换取冷却、配电、网络上的深度共同优化。

播客里提到谷歌给一家叫 Ineffable Intelligence 的公司交付了 Vera Rubin 集群,Amin 说那几排机架的光纤分布照片是他们社交账号历史上最受欢迎的内容之一。他自己评价:美在观者眼中,但对做这行的人来说,那东西确实好看。

FLOPS是虚荣指标,谷歌内部看的是 goodput

索尼娅·黄问谷歌怎么在这轮建设里衡量自己。Amin 说 FLOPS 或者任何以芯片为中心的数字都是理论值,是在特定条件下单芯片能跑出的上限。真正重要的是某个负载实际交付的性能。

而实际性能很少由单芯片决定。可能是2块、8块、1万块芯片怎么组合,加上喂数据的CPU、连接一切的网络。于是他引出谷歌内部的一个词:goodput,可以译成有效吞吐。

他打了个比方。你在纸上解题,第一步第二步第三步,发现第三步错了,退回第一步重来。你确实在干活,这是 throughput。但你交付答案的时间被拉长了,那才是 goodput。故障、恢复、等待排查的时间,全部算在有效吞吐的账上。

同步负载把这个逻辑放大到极致。10万块芯片要在微秒和毫秒级协同,一块出问题,整个任务可能停摆。得先搞清楚哪块坏了,找到上一个检查点,恢复,重启。最坏的情况是从头再来,推理侧更容易出现这种局面。

故障频率有多高?Amin 的回答是,在10万加速器规模下,一天多次是肯定的,某些配置下一小时多次。而且没有单一主要原因,如果存在,早就修掉了。剩下的是不断发现的长尾:新产品上线时被高速互连打脸,网络问题,硬件问题,还有大量软件问题。编译器bug、运行时bug、模型问题、操作系统问题,硬件再完美也救不回来。

他提到这些芯片本身就是制造工艺的极限产物,一颗芯片往往由2个、4个、8个甚至更多小芯片封装而成,旁边还有HBM、网络连接、共封装光学。不是批评,是能坏的地方太多。10万颗凑一起,总有东西坏。所以遥测是个巨大的工程问题,要在秒级、分钟级持续从海量数据里找针,有些任务要盯几小时、几天甚至几周。

服务容量每半年翻一倍,大头来自软件

索尼娅问整体产能规划。Amin 确认了「大约每六个月翻一倍」这个说法,但强调是有效可用容量,落到服务侧就是token生成能力。

关键在后半句:这不等于每半年把FLOPS翻一倍。 让同样硬件每半年产出两倍token,很大一部分来自软件。可能是模型优化,可能是运行时优化,实际是几十上百个小优化接连生效。

那硬件、模型、其他软件各贡献多少?Amin 说没有精确拆分,但经验上大部分收益来自模型侧和软件系统,因为它们让已有硬件被更有效地使用。硬件本身也在快速进步,每年2倍以上的性能提升完全可能,它像一个乘数,把上面所有东西一起抬起来。

他顺带认可了「智能每瓦」这个指标,谷歌内部的版本是「每瓦有效吞吐」。瓦特必须放在分母上,这是后面所有讨论的伏笔。

TPU十三年:一次反直觉押注,到2026年一拆二

谷歌2013年启动自研芯片,当时主流智慧的说法是别为单一负载造专用加速器。理由很充分:摩尔定律还在,18到24个月性能翻倍,标准编程模型、C++、Java、Python 都能直接用。Amin 把这叫做芯片界的「苦涩教训」:专业化永远赢不了。

谷歌还是押了。因为当时有少数几个应用收益极大,用通用CPU支撑要耗费难以想象的数量。公司内部也有不少人没把握。结果这一注押赢了。

第一代芯片只做推理,主要是语言翻译和语音识别。第二代转向训练。差不多在第二代出来的时候,Transformer 被发明,这成了TPU项目的转折点。再往后推荐系统也跑得很好,广告相关负载跟着上来。范围一路扩张,生成式AI时刻到来后又继续放大到更大规模的系统。

2026年谷歌发布了两款芯片:TPU 8i 面向推理,TPU 8t 面向训练。Amin 说这个决定两年前就在讨论,当时的问题是2026年该做一颗还是两颗。如果推理只占市场2%到5%,哪怕专用芯片快2倍也不划算,不如用一颗通用芯片换取一致性。到了2026年,推理和服务真正起飞,专用芯片可能覆盖生命周期内30%到60%的市场,账就算得过来了。

他讲清楚了专业化的本质权衡:越专用越快越省电,也越不灵活。押注的前提是这个负载能活得够久。 如果三个月后就消失,哪怕这三个月需求巨大,拦截窗口也太窄。所以必须能预测这个负载的持久性,以及专业化到底能换来多少。

还有一个容易被忽略的设计细节:8i 和 8t 都能干对方的活。如果一个只能推理一个只能训练,谷歌就得在硬件六年生命周期开始前,精确预测两种需求的比例。现在任何一边有富余产能,都能顶上。专业化做到什么程度,和保留多少可替换性,是同一道题的两面。

索尼娅抛了个挑衅问题:既然满世界都是Transformer,为什么不把Transformer烧进芯片?Amin 说矩阵乘、向量乘、softmax 这些线性代数原语早就硬化了,再往下是针对具体模型架构的专用化,比如多少层、层间怎么走、每个维度的矩阵形状。确实有公司在往那个方向想,他认为很有意思。

和DeepMind在同一个房间改芯片

协同设计在谷歌内部是怎么运转的?Amin 说核心是和 DeepMind 肩并肩工作。硬件有五六道流水线:量产中的、刚从制造商回来在调试的、即将流片的、设计阶段的、概念阶段的,跨度好几年。

在量产那一端,双方一起把每瓦交付的智能做到最大。在即将流片那一端,才是真正有意思的部分。DeepMind 可能提出,如果硬件支持某个数学操作,端到端训练能快一大截。两边工程师挤在一个房间里干几天到两周,常见的结果是:没法完全照你说的做,但可以这样做,你们模型架构那样改,能拿到98%。也可以选择把流片推迟一两周,因为收益太大值得。

Amin 说这种事跨公司边界也能做,但难得多。他还提到一个组织文化层面的原因:谷歌研究、DeepMind、Transformer 的发明都发生在重叠的房间里,这一代研究员习惯了能影响硬件,也清楚硬件按多年周期运转。一个0.5%的小改动,他们不会来找硬件团队,因为知道停流片不是发一个代码变更。 但真有大的机会,双方一定会一起想办法塞进去。

预测五年后什么负载最流行,听起来不可能。Amin 的观点相反。TPU 架构在中等细节层面上,从第一代到现在没怎么变过。就像CPU的指令集一直是load、store、add、branch,上面跑的软件却换了好几代。TPU 的几件事:超大矩阵乘单元、管理向量和散射聚集操作的 SparseCore、通过ICI网络远程读写内存。这些基础原语撑住了很多代模型和算法结构。

长时程Agent把负载形状改了

过去一年最大的负载变化是长时程Agent。Amin 说有两个巨大影响。

第一,不再是人对着加速器交互。你在浏览器里打字,等回复,读,想,再追问,中间是几秒到几十秒。Agent 没有人在环路里天然限速,拿到回复立刻解析、推理、发下一个请求,交互间隔掉到毫秒级。

第二,解析和推理大概率发生在CPU上。CPU 还要判断下一步需要什么上下文,可能从本地DRAM拿,可能从另一台CPU的DRAM拿,可能在SSD上,可能在更远的HDD上。大量编排工作冒出来。结果是对加速算力的需求在涨,对传统CPU、网络、存储的需求也在暴涨。

那要不要把更多CPU机架放到GPU和TPU旁边?Amin 说这正好回到专用化那道题。混放意味着没法把TPU机架的密度和网络需求做到极致。另一种选择是保持同质:TPU放一栋楼,CPU放隔壁,硬盘再放另一栋。代价是跨楼网络,可靠性复杂度上升,成本上升,延迟从微秒级涨到几百微秒甚至更高,还要考虑排队。

他讲这些时的语气挺轻松,索尼娅说你这工作真难,他回了一句:好玩。

光纤、镜子,和毫秒级换机架

谷歌在网络上是老玩家。大概十五六年前,他们是最早在数据中心内部用波分复用的公司之一,一根光纤塞多个信号,机架间通信全走这个。同期引入的还有光电路交换。

Amin 解释得很直白。传统电分组交换机要把包拿到电域,看包头里的目的地址,查表决定从哪个端口转发,每秒几十亿到上万亿个包都这么处理。光电路交换不碰这些比特,它只决定从哪个输入端口的光打到哪个输出端口。最早用的是MEMS微镜,用微机电马达控制三维反射镜,一个128端口或256端口的盒子,每个输入端口的光纤通过镜子反射到指定输出端口,镜子的角度可以编程改。

最初做这件事有两个原因。一是给机架群之间造局部性,搜索的计算集群和存储集群之间通信多,就用镜子纯光学地搭捷径。二是可以在不移动任何光纤的情况下扩容和缩容网络骨干。

到了TPU时代,这套东西有了新用途。TPU之间是环面拓扑直接互连,当一个TPU机架故障,可以把光重定向到备用机架,不用人碰光纤,毫秒级完成。

索尼娅追问,那为什么还要光纤,干脆全用自由空间光?Amin 说衰减和带宽会大幅下降,而且在超大建筑尺度上,不用光纤在三维空间里对准几乎不可能。他们认真讨论过这件事,结论还是以光纤为主。

电力是唯一真正卡住的东西

被问到最大约束是什么,Amin 说没有单一最大约束,全都是,而且不断在变。但根本上,电是最底层那一个。其他问题看起来都知道怎么解,只是时间问题。电是长期的绑定约束。他提到丰富的清洁能源,比如核能,能解决很多问题,但什么时候规模化仍然未知。

那实际操作怎么做?假设要建一个需要1吉瓦的数据中心。Amin 说谷歌的首选永远是用电网,接公用电网。当然要提前很多年通知电力公司,吉瓦级不是明天要、你什么时候开始计费的事,是双方一起规划。

他还专门讲了一个容易被忽略的责任:电网为我们新建或升级输电线路、增加变电站,这些成本谷歌自己承担,避免摊到其他用户电价上。

时间错配真实存在。比如2028年需要1吉瓦,电力公司2029年才能给到1吉瓦,2028年只能给700兆瓦。剩下300兆瓦怎么办,一部分答案是自己建一些发电,太阳能、电池备用,或者在电力充足时反过来向电网送电。 他提到一年中最热的两周居民用电暴涨,如果本地有发电能力,可以回馈电网。

为什么不干脆完全自建?Amin 用统计复用来解释。要1吉瓦且做到99.99%以上可靠性,得建2吉瓦,一加一冗余,非常贵,还要保证是清洁能源、离数据中心不远。和电网合作,把自己的一部分发电能力在对方需要时送出去,在自己需要时取电,靠更大的基数做统计复用,大家都赢。极少数情况下会在表后自建,但依然假设最终要接电网。

数据中心建多大,是一道没有标准答案的题

Amin 说这是门艺术,内部争论很多。十到十五年前谷歌就在争论要不要把所有东西塞进一个数据中心,那时候1吉瓦就是想象中的极限。单点故障是显而易见的担忧,放在30年周期里更是如此。

但训练负载的逻辑相反,越大越好,网络距离越短越好。于是两个问题同时压过来:单点故障,和电力可得性。今天全世界没有任何一个地方能装下谷歌的全部需求,这不存在。

所以答案是分层。边缘节点可能几十兆瓦,和运营商合作的可能就是一个机架,训练集群接近1吉瓦,其他站点几百兆瓦。他们有模型和模拟器,但结论随场景变。

生命周期管理上,索尼娅的猜测部分正确:最新最大的集群训练前沿模型,老的回收做推理。Amin 说框架合理,但不能只靠老训练集群做推理,因为推理需求太大。而且训练集群在某一年会集中在同一大洲甚至同一区域,其他大洲的推理容量就不够了,必须单独建服务集群。

服务集群不一定更便宜。推理需要把计算、网络、存储放得近,反而更难专用化。训练是又大又密的同质部署,推理是混合部署,而且要分散到全球各地靠近用户,同一个模型还有多个版本。所以服务集群更小,垂直整合程度更低。

Amin 之前说过一句被广泛引用的话:七八年前的老TPU还在100%利用率。这次他补充了完整逻辑。折旧年限大约六年,新一代能效更高,所以到期确实会换。但换的是整个pod,一个TPU pod大约9600颗芯片、150多个机架。新pod的占地未必正好匹配旧pod腾出的空间,而他们没法提前几代规划这件事,拆旧装新本身就是硬活。

开放标准:JAX很好,但你也可以用PyTorch

谷歌内部开发了JAX,用得很重。Amin 说他们完全可以要求「想上TPU就用JAX」,但他们做了TorchTPU,让未修改的PyTorch模型能直接跑。

他拿IP协议做类比。七十年代末八十年代初有很多竞争协议,IP赢了,因为它是开放标准,是沙漏的细腰,上面什么软件都能跑,下面什么硬件都能接,任何人拿IP插进路由器端口就成了互联网的一部分。这就是互联网能铺开的原因。

他的表述是:想插高度专用的东西可以,觉得自己的东西更好也可以插进来,但谷歌要支持开放标准和开源。 这也是他们同时提供CPU、GPU和其他加速器的原因。

AI已经在改硬件工程本身

软件工程被AI改变已经有大量公开讨论,Amin 说硬件侧的变化外界关注少,但同样显著。他当天刚看了数字,硬件工程师用AI的程度和软件工程师一样高。从设计启动到流片的时间在缩短,bring-up 的时间在缩短。

另一个不那么被预期的变化是数据中心设计。1吉瓦单体还是100兆瓦、200兆瓦园区,过去是非常细致的电子表格加人工决策过程,现在有大量AI参与,把信息汇集到一起,摆到做决策的人面前。他特别说明,还不是推理模型在替人做判断,人依然在决策环里。

他还提到一句很有意思的话:谷歌在用Gemini设计给未来Gemini用的硬件。

太空数据中心:账算得过来,麻烦也一堆

索尼娅问轨道数据中心。Amin 确认谷歌在认真推进,内部称之为 moonshot,没有开玩笑的意思。

账是这么算的。太空没有大气衰减,太阳能多出大约40%,也就是1.4倍。更关键的是在太阳同步轨道上,太阳能板有98%到100%的时间被太阳照到,地面只有28%到35%。1.4倍乘上3到4倍的时间,电池基本可以从等式里去掉,还是零碳。这是能源约束下少有的、物理层面成立的解法。

麻烦同样清楚。散热在太空里反而更难。可靠性问题被放大,维修更难,他说也许真会派机器人上去。冗余会成为朋友。自由空间光通信从讨论变成必需,激光要对准接收器并实时校准。他的结论是没有根本性的拦路石。

2036年的 frontier 超算长什么样

Amin 说十年正好在不确定性的边缘,也许有人已经在想2036年的机器,但锥形的误差范围太宽。

从趋势看,集成度会大幅提高。他为 Ineffable 做的 VR200 机架光纤很漂亮,2036年会更集成、更少光纤。他说不敢说完全没有光纤,但可能只有一小束从机架里出来。机架本身会在中央工厂制造,里面深集成72、144、288,甚至576、1152颗加速器。单个机架功率到多兆瓦。

使用方式会变得像插家电:把机架推到位,接上水、电、光纤,三根线插好就能跑。

索尼娅最后问,那会不会是一个漂浮在太空的外星球体。Amin 说2036年不排除直接发射上太空,由空间站的机械臂接住,插进对应模块。他说这事想想就很好玩。

明天就能用上的三件事

第一,评估任何AI基础设施方案时,把「理论算力」换成「有效吞吐」。问对方三个问题:这个数字是在什么负载下测的,故障时恢复要多久,恢复期间算不算进交付时间。三个问题问完,很多漂亮的benchmark会露出底色。

第二,做容量规划时,把「每瓦交付的智能」当成主指标,而不是绝对值。Amin 的说法很清楚,同样硬件每半年产出翻倍,大头来自模型和运行时优化。这意味着预算里软件优化的投入回报,可能高于再加一批卡。

第三,如果你在规划自建算力,先算电力这笔账,而且要按年算,不是按月。吉瓦级需求要提前数年与电网共同规划,99.99%可靠性意味着2倍建设量。把这个约束提前放进路线图,比事后找电便宜得多。

「我们这代人有幸经历这件事,也有幸定义它。」Amin Vahdat 在结尾这么说。

这句话放在一堆故障率、兆瓦数和输电线路中间,倒是不显得空。

文稿来源:sequoiacap.com;机器转写可能有识别错误,人名与数字请以音频为准。
id="podcast-transcript" data-framer-component-type="RichTextContainer" style="transform:none">IntroductionAmin Vahdat: In hardware, as you know, there is this opportunity where the more you specialize to a particular workload, the less flexible it is, but the faster and the more power-efficient the hardware is going to be. So it is this art, and it's this projection of what you're designing to and how persistent that workload is. In other words, if it's going to go away after a month or two months or three months, even if it's big for those three months, you've got a really narrow window to intercept it. So it has to be somewhat durable, and you have to be able to project exactly what you can get for specializing to it. Main conversationSonya Huang: Thrilled to welcome Amin Vahdat to the show. Amin, thank you for joining us today. Amin Vahdat: It's really exciting to be here. I'm really looking forward to it. Sonya Huang: I am very excited for today's topic, because we are in the middle of the biggest CapEx buildout in human history, and you are in the middle of it. Google alone is expected to spend more than $200 billion on CapEx this year, most of which is going into building data centers. You're at the center of it all. You were named the head of Google's AI infra at the end of last year, so you are the man spearheading the efforts of one of the most capital-intensive buildouts in human history. I am really excited to get into it with you today. Amin Vahdat: It's a huge year, for sure—across the industry, including at Google. I don't think we've ever seen anything like this, honestly. Certainly not at Google. But as you said, I think in the history of humanity, in terms of the buildout and the pace of transformation, it's really unbelievable. Sonya Huang: Before we get into it, maybe just a crash course for the audience. What is an AI data center, and how is it different from a non-AI data center? Amin Vahdat: It's a very good question, in that an AI data center and a non-AI data center do have a lot of similarities, actually. They're not radically different. It consists of concrete, an enclosure. It consists of electrical yards, mechanical yards, cooling. You have row after row of power being distributed. There's a huge amount of network infrastructure there—in other words, we connect large amounts of compute to one another. A fair amount of storage infrastructure goes in there. I think the big difference that we're seeing with AI infrastructure is specialization. In the past, when we were building a data center, it really was a 25-, 30-year building investment, and we were thinking about how it's going to be evolving over that 25-, 30-year period. You might have servers go into it, you might have networking, storage, you might have some accelerators—GPUs, TPUs, whatever they might be—going into it. But it's a 25-, 30-year planning horizon, and the lifetime of the hardware might be six years. So there are many generations that we have to plan for. An AI data center oftentimes is going to be more purpose-built. In other words, we are oftentimes co-designing the building with the hardware that might go into it. We might be saying, "You know what, actually, we're not going to put a lot of storage into this building." Why? Because a storage rack might have 10, 20, 30, 40 kilowatts of power. You put that next to a CPU rack or a GPU rack that easily is hitting hundreds of kilowatts today, and might hit megawatts—people are talking about that in the next two years. Designing a building that might take 30 storage racks in a row versus one or two AI racks in that same row is a very, very different design. Just think of it in terms of the size. Think of it in terms of the power and how that would be distributed across the building. Networking would be the same: the amount of networking that you would need for a storage rack is tiny, especially if it's hard drives, compared to an AI rack. So if you're trying to make it fully fungible, you'll probably make it too big and too overbuilt—fungible over, certainly, a 30-year period. An AI data center likely is going to be much more purpose-built, co-designed with the hardware, even to the point of cooling and power distribution. So a lot more co-optimization. Sonya Huang: You all delivered a big Vera Rubin cluster to one of my portfolio companies, Ineffable Intelligence, and I saw the photographs of it as it went out. That is a thing of beauty. Amin Vahdat: It is. It is. Sonya Huang: It's one of those things where, similar to looking at the biggest construction projects in human history, you look at that data center and it's like, wow, that is a monument to what mankind can do. Amin Vahdat: We've got a nice picture of it. And this is just a couple of racks. The cabling, the fiber distribution for it, is really beautiful. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, but for folks like me and probably yourself and others in the audience as well, it is a thing of beauty. We put this picture up on social media, and people love the fact that it's Ineffable—they're huge fans of what they're doing, fantastic team—and that got a lot of attention. "Okay, great rack for Ineffable." But actually, people just loved seeing the pictures of the fiber and the sort of fractal nature of the fiber. One of the most popular posts that we've ever had, actually, was around that. So yeah, absolutely, we're really, really excited about that. Sonya Huang: Yeah, I had goosebumps seeing the picture. How do you measure and hold yourself accountable in the middle of this big buildout? We were talking right before the show about how FLOPS is a vanity metric and you prefer an alternate metric. Can you say more? Amin Vahdat: Yeah. So one thing to note is that whether it's FLOPS or your other favorite chip-centric metric, these are in theory. In other words, under some conditions, for whatever chip you have, this is the maximum amount of FLOPS that you can deliver. What we really care about in the end is the performance delivered by workload. That's what we're looking at. And it happens, but actually relatively rarely, that that performance is determined by a single chip—its FLOPS, its HBM, its SRAM capacity. Those are all super important, but it might be how two, four, eight, 16, 1,000, 10,000 or more of these chips compose together—not just the accelerators, whether CPUs or GPUs, but then the CPUs that might feed them the data, the network that connects them all together. So what is the workload that you're running, and what is the performance of that workload? One measure that is interesting is your FLOPS utilization. So, for example, for a particular workload, if you have in theory a teraflop or petaflop capable for your workload, what fraction of that are you delivering? Now, that's a measure of goodput. What is goodput? You can think of throughput, which is a well-known term. That's the throughput that is possible. But now let's consider some other considerations. One is the slowdown of the workload—again, just enhance the workload. But other aspects of it really hit our reliability. So in terms of how we hold ourselves accountable: if we have a chip failing for a synchronous workload—and many of these workloads, whether training or serving or agentic workloads, are synchronous—there are many, many components that are working together simultaneously. Now, if you have, let's say, 1,000, 10,000, 100,000 of these components working together simultaneously, and they really need to coordinate at microsecond and millisecond granularity, one of them fails, and it might actually bring the whole thing to a stop. Because everyone is counting on everyone else to do their part of the job in order to come up with the answer to a really tough question. One of them stops. Okay, now we have to figure out what happened. Which one stopped? What's a checkpoint that we have of the computation at some previous state and time? How do we restore that checkpoint? How do we restart? Worst case, we have to restart from the beginning. That would be really bad, but that can happen in certain cases, especially more on the inference side. The point here is that if you then have to go back and redo a bunch of computation, if you have to pause and wait to figure out what happened with the failure, all that work is work. It's not actually helping you get the answer. Let's say that you're working out a problem on paper. Step one, step two, step three, step four. If you have to go back to step one because you made a mistake, yes, you're still doing work. That's throughput. You're doing work. But what is the goodput in delivering your answer? It's basically the total amount of time it took you to solve the problem. That's what matters. And if you have failures, if you have failure recovery, if you have whatever it is that's interrupting your work, that's part of the issue. So how do we hold ourselves accountable? It's delivered goodput. It's not theoretical benchmark throughput, or goodput in theory, but actually, for a workload, for real failure conditions, what's happening. And the unfortunate reality is that at 100,000-accelerator scale— Sonya Huang: I was going to say, at that scale something's failing all the time, right? Amin Vahdat: All the time. And each one of these chips, as you're aware, is a wonder of nature. They're at the very bleeding edge of what's possible to manufacture. To me, it's stunning. And now, actually, these chips aren't just one chip. They're packages made up of, in many cases, two, four, eight, maybe more chiplets that are composing together. And then of course HBM off to the side, network connectivity, maybe things like co-packaged optics. Not a criticism—lots of things can fail. And if you've got 100,000 of them, something is going to fail. You have to be prepared for that. Detect that in near real time, recover from that in near real time. Doing all that—the telemetry problem is massive. It's like finding a needle in the haystack continuously, across certainly seconds and minutes, but for some of these jobs, hours and days and even weeks. Just continuous and online. How we hold ourselves accountable is the goodput that we deliver for the workloads that actually matter in the data center. Sonya Huang: Is "goodput" a Google term, or is it an industry term? Amin Vahdat: It's a Google term. But I think more and more people across the industry are starting to pick it up. Sonya Huang: And then just to calibrate me, at 100,000-accelerator scale, are we talking it's going to fail once a minute, once a day? How often? Amin Vahdat: 100,000 accelerators. Let me see. I think it is definitely going to be, at that scale, multiple times a day, and perhaps, depending on the exact configuration, multiple times an hour something is going to fail. Sonya Huang: And what are the most common failure reasons? Amin Vahdat: This is the problem, actually. It's a very good question. If there were a common failure reason, we would have figured it out and fixed it. It is a long tail of constant discovery. Whenever we have a new product that's being introduced, there's going to be something that hits us—in many cases, frankly, because it's at the very bleeding edge. It might be network-related. It might be how we connect these things together at super high speed. That might be something to do with the hardware. Those things we work through. But then a lot of the issues could be software. So this is the other aspect of how we hold ourselves accountable. The chip might be capable of a certain level of FLOPS, but if you have a compiler bug, a runtime bug, a model issue, an operating system issue, it doesn't matter—that's going to impact the end-to-end system performance. So you might have perfect hardware, fully reliable, but then you might have software issues that hurt you. Sonya Huang: Is there a standard reference stack from the accelerator companies—from Nvidia or from the TPU team—of "here is the optimal system to build around our accelerators, and as long as you build to that system, you're good"? Or how much of your own data center design do you have to do above and beyond what the semiconductor companies give you? Amin Vahdat: Right. So there's a reference stack. And I would say that Nvidia is an incredible whole-systems company. They are obviously a semiconductor company, but they're not just a semiconductor company. They give you a really, really strong reference stack. But the way I'd put it is, most of our customers leverage that reference stack, but many also specialize. In other words, they might find that, as natural for their particular use case, they have an optimization opportunity or something different that they need to do, and they're going to do that. Similarly, for the TPU side, we have a reference stack. Most people will leverage that, but many will specialize it as well. Sonya Huang: Got it. And then in terms of overall capacity, you've told your teams that Google has to roughly double the serving capacity every six months or so. Is that right? Amin Vahdat: Well, to be clear, this is in terms of effective available capacity. The way in the end that we look at it, from a serving perspective, is token generation capability. So capacity—and this is where I would say it's a combination of software and hardware. The hardware might have some, quote unquote, inherent level of FLOPS. What I'm saying here is not necessarily that you have to double the number of FLOPS every six months. That's one path. You have to double the capability of that hardware to generate tokens every six months. And as much or more of that is going to come from software as it is from hardware. In other words, it could be a model optimization that delivers that. It could be some runtime optimization that delivers that. It's really probably going to be dozens or hundreds of individual optimizations that are just landing again and again and again to make it all possible. But yes, the rate of capacity improvement is incredible. Sonya Huang: We've had a few years of data center buildout now and a few years of model progress and software progress. What has been the empirical breakdown of how much capacity—maybe as measured by intelligence per watt—how much capacity increase has come from the silicon itself versus the models versus other software, and any other kind of big components? Amin Vahdat: Yeah, it's a really good question. I don't have the exact breakdown, but I would say that in our experience, most of the benefits come from model-side improvements, in terms of intelligence per watt. And by the way, intelligence per watt is a fantastic metric, really focusing. For us, it's goodput per watt, and we can come back to why the watts need to be the denominator. Goodput could well be a measure of the intelligence delivered per watt—in other words, goodput as a workload-specific metric. But I would say most of the gains often come from the model side, the software system. Quite a bit. Why? Because they're able to actually make sure that the hardware that you have is being used effectively. And then the hardware—it is pretty stunning. In other words, we're living in a world right now where 2x or more year-over-year performance improvement is absolutely possible. And so the hardware does support it. It's, if you want, a free multiplier—not free, but everyone else above it can count on it in terms of that being a multiplier that lifts everyone else up year over year. Sonya Huang: I'd love to talk a bit about the TPU program and co-design. Google started building custom silicon more than a decade ago. It was a contrarian call at the time. How has the TPU program evolved? Amin Vahdat: Quite a lot. When the program started in 2013, it was really a contrarian call. And I think that at the time—it's hard to put yourself back into the moment—2013 conventional wisdom, all the smartest, wisest people would say, you don't build a custom-built accelerator for a single workload. Why? Because Moore's Law is there. Doubling of performance every, whatever it is, 18 or 24 months is there. You get to leverage standard programming models, all your C++ code, Java, Python, whatever it might be. Sonya Huang: The bitter lesson of chips. Amin Vahdat: Yes, exactly. The bitter lesson of chips is that specialization never wins. But in this particular case, we had this one application, or a few, a small number of them, that would benefit tremendously, and that would require an unimaginable amount of general-purpose CPU to support. So really, in 2013, it was a bet. And there were quite a few people, even within the company, I would say, who were not sure that it would work out. So it was a bet. It turned out to be a massively successful bet. The first chip was all about inference. The second chip was, hey, actually, we can take the same idea and build a training chip. From there, it got picked up for more and more use cases. Around the time the second chip came out, transformers were invented. This was a major, major moment, and that actually completely shifted the TPU program. We of course learned that recommender systems could run really, really well on the TPUs, and so ads and related use cases came along. So I would say that the evolution has been one of expansion in scope and impact. In other words, it started with a really impactful use case of a couple of applications for inference serving—this was language translation primarily, and voice recognition—to then training, to then transformers, recommender systems, and continuing to generalize as the GenAI moment took hold, to ever larger, ever more scalable systems as well. Sonya Huang: You mentioned the moment the transformer came through being a major moment, and I'm curious to explore—the TPU was a specific architecture, but it wasn't specific to the transformer. How do you straddle the fine line of how specific you want your chip to be for the workload? Amin Vahdat: This is a great question, and I think it really comes down to the applicability of the chip to a particular workload. In the end, we've been thinking about this for every generation: would we further specialize? The question that we were facing, let's say two years ago or a little bit more, was: in 2026, should we have two chips or one? We could have one chip that could do inference and training simultaneously and do both quite well. Or we could have two chips, one that was further specialized for inference and a second one that was further specialized for training. This analysis and this work led to the release of two chips this year: TPU 8i for inference, TPU 8t for training. And in the end, what we realized is that it wasn't the case necessarily a couple of years ago, but by '26 we saw inference and serving really taking off. And so having a chip that would be significantly faster for serving—that we thought might be 30, 40, 50, 60% of the market in its lifetime—started making a lot of sense for us. Relative to, if we projected inference to be 2% or 5% of the market, even if that specialized chip is, let's say, 2x faster, it might not make sense, right? Because you'd actually go for the one general-purpose chip that's not fully optimized, but that's okay, because you now have the uniformity. So really it does come down to a calculus question of: okay, would you further specialize? How big is that workload? How big is that workload projected to be in a couple of, three or four, years? Is this sustained growth for a particular workload? In hardware, as you know, there is this opportunity where the more you specialize to a particular workload, the less flexible it is, but the faster and the more power-efficient the hardware is going to be. So it is this art, and it's this projection of what you're designing to and how persistent that workload is. In other words, if it's going to go away after a month or two months or three months, even if it's big for those three months, you've got a really narrow window to intercept it. So it has to be somewhat durable, and you have to be able to project exactly what you can get for specializing to it. Sonya Huang: So the rough tradeoff is there's a large fixed cost to support a new program— Amin Vahdat: Yes. Sonya Huang: —and you basically have to think that there's going to be enough demand for that specific program to justify the cost. Amin Vahdat: Exactly. And to some extent—for example, for our 8i and 8t chips, both chips can do the other workload. This is also key. If 8i could only do inference and couldn't do training at all—in other words, it had zero performance for training—and then vice versa, if 8t was amazing at training and had zero performance for inference, that would have also been a key limitation. Why? Because we would have to predict ahead of time, over a six-year period, the lifetime of the hardware, exactly how much we need of each. In this case, it was nice because both chips are better at what they're specialized for, but if you had leftover capacity in one place or the other, both can actually do the other's job. Depending on the specialization you do, you might get so specialized that you actually limit yourself from being flexible, fungible. Sonya Huang: And if the rough tradeoff is the size of the program—on the other end, it seems to me that so much of the modern AI market is transformer-based. So maybe just to ask a provocative question, why not just burn the transformer architecture into the chip? Amin Vahdat: Yeah. So I think it's transformer-based, but then the next level of question would be: transformers, in the end, are about vector and matrix multiply operations, and a softmax. There's a range of essentially linear algebra primitives. We have those, and others do as well, roughly baked into the hardware. It's all transformer-based, but then there's your model architecture. Okay, how many layers do you have? How do you go through the layers? How do you go across the layers? For each dimension, what exact shape of matrices and vectors are you applying? You could go further and specialize to not just the transformer but your model. That's the next level of specialization. I think there are a number of companies out there that are thinking about that. I think it's a very, very interesting direction as well. Sonya Huang: Okay. So at this point in time, do your customers view TPU and GPU as roughly fungible equivalents, or is there a certain set of problems that is better suited for one or the other? Amin Vahdat: There's for sure a set of problems that are better suited for one or the other. GPUs are more general-purpose than TPUs, for one. That is clear. They're incredible products. At Google and Google Cloud, we sell a lot of GPUs. We use GPUs internally. But I think it really then comes down to the specifics of your problem. There is overlap between the two, but our customers then evaluate the workload and evaluate their options. What we like to do at Google is give our customers choice. In other words, we want to have the right solution for their needs, and of course provide the solution that best meets their needs for them. Sonya Huang: What is the case for co-design, from the chip to the network to the software? And then what is the case against co-design? Amin Vahdat: Yeah. So there are huge optimization opportunities with co-design. What you can imagine is that if you have an N-layer stack and you want to be able to pick and choose whatever component you want—let's say you're running across many clouds, or you're running across many pieces of hardware, many pieces of software—you could design abstraction layers that would basically say, I can run on any hardware, I can run on any software, I can run on any network topology, any amount of network that you give me, no problem. And my system is going to be fully adaptive. So now you have a great capability. You can move anywhere. New capacity becomes available overnight, and you're up and running, because you've designed your system that way, to actually be able to take advantage of anything. You have not hard-coded or specialized at all to anyone's particular infrastructure. The downside is you probably leave a lot of performance on the table if you become fully fungible, fully flexible to anybody's hardware, software, network, storage, compute stack. So the case for co-designing is that between each one of those layers, there's a big impedance mismatch if you try to get full generality. There might be 10%, 20%, 2x across each of these layers. You start multiplying those optimization opportunities through, and all of a sudden you're left with a big end-to-end opportunity in terms of, whatever you want to say, intelligence per watt or output per watt, that you can leverage—all the way down to power delivery and power availability, software optimizations, et cetera. So the pros are you can run anywhere, anytime. You have no lock-in. The cons are you're leaving, in all likelihood, significant amounts of performance on the table. Sonya Huang: So my understanding is that if you take OpenAI and Anthropic, OpenAI was primarily building on a homogeneous compute stack, and Anthropic was building a roughly more heterogeneous compute stack. Do you think that co-design is part of the reason why they converged on what is rumored to be very different architectures for their models? Amin Vahdat: I don't want to speculate in terms of what OpenAI and Anthropic are doing. It's one possibility, but without knowing the details of what they're doing, I would imagine that there could be many reasons for why they wind up with different architectures. Sonya Huang: Well, what about for Google, then? I'm curious what the working relationship looks like between your team and DeepMind. Who's in the room at what stage of model development, and how are you making decisions together on co-design? Amin Vahdat: It's one of the most fun and frankly gratifying parts of being at Google: the opportunity to work really shoulder to shoulder with the DeepMind team in terms of co-design of our hardware and models. There's a third element to it, in that we also get to extend that with the consumer services and Cloud. I'll put that aside for a moment; I can come back to it. But with respect to DeepMind, it really is a deep partnership. From the past, I can give you examples where they have come up with model optimizations, let's say to transformers or to particular math that they might want to do, and we might have a chip in progress, not quite done. But then they say, "Oh my gosh, if we had hardware support for this, our end-to-end training or serving might get significantly faster, more efficient. What would it take to actually change the hardware definition that we're in execution on to accommodate this?" And this then leads to our engineers and their researchers getting together intensely in the same room for a few days, a week, two weeks, saying, "Okay, yes, we can do this." More likely: "We couldn't quite do what you wanted, but we can do this other thing. And then maybe you can change your model architecture in this other direction. That gives you 98%. That gives us 90% of what we're looking for." And yes, we can then go back and intercept the hardware. Or we can say, "You know what? We're going to delay the tape-out by a week or two weeks, because wow, for this level of benefit, it's totally worth it." Similarly, when we're projecting our roadmap out—we have many generations of chips that are essentially in progress at any point in time. We have the chips that are in production. That's one. We have the chips that we're working on getting into production; they're already back from the manufacturer, and we're debugging them, making them work. We have the chips that are in implementation that are about to tape out and go to the manufacturer. We have the chips that are in design phase. And then we have the chips that are in concept phase. So it's really this five-, six-stage, many-year pipeline from introduction to end of life. The collaboration with DeepMind for in-production is significant, because we get to work together in maximizing delivered intelligence, or delivered goodput, per watt. We know exactly what's happening in the model, and we know exactly what's happening in the hardware and everything in between. We also get to collaborate deeply on the chips that are just about to tape out. Why? Because we can intercept, and we can make changes to the chip—literally the chip architecture—in flight, which would be somewhere between hard and impossible to do if we were working across company boundaries. Not impossible, but it would be much harder for us to say, "Oh my gosh, we're a few weeks or a few months away from getting this chip done, and now let's get in the same room, shoulder to shoulder, and figure out if we should disrupt the program." It's possible, but harder, is what I would say. And then of course, for the chips that are in design, we have many architectures we can evaluate together. We can ask our colleagues in DeepMind, where do you see model architectures going in two or three years' time? Here's the Pareto of things that we can do. Here's the Pareto of where model architecture is going. We actually have deep and significant simulation infrastructure that can predict how the workloads are going to map to different hardware architectures. Deep and fast iteration. It really isn't the teams working separately. It's in the same building, same rooms, many times. Deep daily interaction. I talk to, whether it's Koray or Demis, multiple times a week. So it really is a super fun aspect of the work. Sonya Huang: That's awesome. And eventually their models will help with chip design. Amin Vahdat: We're using Gemini to design hardware for future Geminis as well. Sonya Huang: That's really cool. I want to come back to that a little bit later. On the collaboration itself—is there an impedance mismatch still? I figure the cycle times are probably just slower when you're dealing with hardware than your DeepMind folks get to deal with on the software side. And I figure your planning cycles are much further ahead. So how much room do you actually have to adjust? Amin Vahdat: Yeah, it's a really good question. We are planning hardware two, three, four, five years in advance, no question. In other words, we talked about TPU 8i and 8t that we just announced, but you can imagine that 9, 10, and maybe some others are in concept, in execution, in something else, and they might be years out. If you're working with model architecture, by default you're not going to be thinking years out. But I think this is also the great thing about how the company has grown up together. In other words, Google Research and DeepMind and transformers being invented—all of this was happening in these overlapping rooms as well. So there's a whole generation of researchers who've grown accustomed to being able to influence the hardware, and knowing that the hardware is operating on multi-year cycles. They also know that, look, if they have a small tweak that's going to deliver 1% or 0.5% or something like that for a chip that's about to tape out, they're probably not going to come to us, because they know enough to know that it's not like software, where you can just do a change list and it's going to ship to production in two weeks' time. Stopping a tape-out is a big deal. But they also know if they've got a really good opportunity, yes, we're absolutely going to work together to figure out if we can get it in there. So as I said, it's multiplicative in terms of where the benefits come from. The hardware does lift all the tides, right? And so significant portions of the DeepMind team—and we're so grateful for it; it's an amazing team—significant portions of it are thinking about, how do I influence the roadmap? Because it's actually a pipeline. The idea I had two years ago is in production now, and it's helping all the workloads at Google go faster. That's a good feeling. Sonya Huang: Totally. It seems like an impossible task, though, to predict in five years what workloads will be most common and what algorithmic breakthroughs will have occurred. Doesn't it seem like an impossible task? Amin Vahdat: I hear you that it would seem like an impossible task. But here's the awesome thing—and actually, we're working on writing this up in great, great detail, and it's a lot of fun to do it. The stunning thing is that the TPU architecture, at a medium level of detail—not at a super high level of detail, at a medium level of detail—hasn't really changed since TPU v1. One way to look at it is the instruction set architecture for a CPU. You've got loads and you've got stores and you've got adds and you've got subtracts and branches. And yet what has the software on top of it done over that period of time? Same thing with TPUs. We have some fundamental instructions and fundamental primitives. Of course we've extended it—it's not like the instruction set hasn't changed at all—but the primitives are there, in terms of specializing the numerics to very big, very large matrix multiply units; a SparseCore that manages vector operations and scatter-gather operations. There are five or six things that really define it. Remote load-store—that's another one, actually. We can read and write remote memory through our ICI network. The fundamentals have been there, and they've extended to many generations of models, many generations of even deep neural network algorithms and model structures. Sonya Huang: Okay. Speaking of shifting workloads, it seems like one of the biggest changes in workloads over the last year or so—I think it really started at the beginning of this calendar year—was the rise of the long-horizon agent. Amin Vahdat: Yes. Sonya Huang: And I would guess that's a very different shape of workload than the quick-turn LLM conversations of years past. What does that mean in terms of data center needs? Amin Vahdat: Yeah. So I think there are two huge aspects to this. One is it's no longer human-to-accelerator interaction. In other words, when you are typing at a prompt in a web browser or on your phone or whatever, of course in response to your prompt there's going to be a bunch of work that happens. But then when the response comes back, you've got to read it. You've got to think about it. And then maybe you have a follow-up. That's going to be multiple seconds of interaction time. Now, in long-horizon agents, there's no human in the loop that is going to naturally rate-limit how quickly requests are going to go to the model. So what went from seconds, maybe tens of seconds, in terms of interaction time is now going into perhaps milliseconds. As soon as I get a response back, I can parse it, I can reason about it perhaps a bit, and I can figure out what my next request is going to be. So that's big change one. Big change two is all that reasoning and all that parsing is going to probably happen on a CPU, and that CPU is then going to have to think about, okay, what other state do I need to go gather before making my next prompt back into the model? In other words, I've learned something from this response. I'm going to take another step, but I actually need to go grab some context—maybe from DRAM local to me, maybe from someone else's DRAM on another CPU, maybe on SSD, or maybe on HDD somewhere else. So now a huge amount of orchestration has to take place as well. So the design actually is changing pretty significantly, where the demand for accelerated compute is going up, but the demand for CPU and networking and storage—traditional data center CPU—is also going through the roof. Sonya Huang: So does that mean you're putting more CPUs alongside your GPU racks, then? Amin Vahdat: GPU, TPU racks—this is the key question, going back to this question of optimization and specialization. If we start putting lots of CPU racks—and it is a question—next to the GPUs and TPUs, that means that actually we can't fully specialize to the density and network requirements, let's say, of a TPU rack relative to a CPU rack. A TPU rack is going to be more dense than a CPU rack. It's probably going to need more networking than a CPU rack. So in other words, now our building design is going to change. Another option is to maintain your uniformity. Put your GPUs or TPUs all in one building, and in the building next door, maybe put your CPUs. And maybe, by the way, the hard drives have to be in another building on the other side, because they have yet another set of requirements. Now you need networking between these buildings at a pretty significant level. Once you leave a building, the networking complexity goes up significantly, from a reliability perspective, from a cost perspective. Latency goes up—probably acceptably, but still, now you might go to hundreds of microseconds, potentially more, with queuing between the components. So the considerations do change in pretty interesting ways. Sonya Huang: Your job is hard. Amin Vahdat: It's fun. Yeah. Sonya Huang: What's happening on the networking side? I've heard that Google's always been at the forefront of the newest in networking, including optical. Can you say a word on the state of optical networking? Amin Vahdat: We at Google, this was probably 15, 16 years ago, were among the first to bring essentially what's called wavelength-division multiplexing—where you could put multiple signals on a single fiber—within the data center. And we actually leverage that for all of our communication between racks. At the same time, we introduced a technology, along with the wavelength-division multiplexing, called optical circuit switching. Essentially what optical circuit switching does, in contrast with traditional electrical packet switching, is it transmits and moves data entirely in the optical domain. Let me describe the technology that underpins it. In a packet switch, you would take a packet. It has a header. You would look at it in the electrical domain, figure out where the packet is headed. In its header, it might have an IP address that says, okay, where am I headed? You look up, for that destination, in a table: what port do I forward it along? So basically billions and billions, perhaps trillions, of packets coming through at super high speed per second, and you're forwarding them along. Optical circuit switching says, I'm not touching these bits in the electrical domain. What I'm going to do is figure out, for an input port, which output port to send the light to. There are multiple ways to do this. The one that we started with is called MEMS switches—micro-electrical motors that basically control mirrors in 3D. So we can now programmatically take a box that might have, you pick, 128 ports, 256 ports, some number like that, and we can configure every input port for a fiber that comes into it, map it to an output port, and then change the rotation of mirrors, where the light literally shines down on these mirrors and gets reflected to the right output port. Initially, the reason we did this was twofold. One was to create locality between groups of racks. Let's say I had a compute cluster and a storage cluster, and both of them were in support of—again, making it up—search. We knew that these two clusters would talk to each other a lot, so we would configure the mirrors to create shortcuts, purely optically, between those two clusters of racks. That was reason number one. Reason number two was we wanted to be able to expand the network and contract the network without actually moving any fiber. Without going into the details—I could draw this on a board—the optical circuit switch would allow you to actually reconfigure the spine of the network, to expand it or shrink it, without a human being having to do anything other than be, literally, a controller that would manage that. Now fast-forward to TPUs. A TPU has a torus topology that connects all the TPUs to one another directly. I talked about throughput and goodput earlier. One of the things that we can do is, if we have a TPU rack that fails, we can replace it with another TPU rack without moving any fiber. Again, I'd have to wave my hands or draw on the whiteboard, but essentially we can say we have a spare rack available at all times, and when a rack fails, we redirect the light to that new rack. And that can be done in milliseconds. Sonya Huang: Why do you have the fiber at all, then? Amin Vahdat: As opposed to fully free-space? Yeah, it's a very good question. Attenuation loss, and bandwidth would drop dramatically. Furthermore, across the range of a very large building, aiming everything without the benefit of fiber to connect it all together in 3D would be challenging to possibly impossible. We've talked about it, actually, and there have been some really interesting discussions. But yes, it's mostly in fiber. But then when they hit the optical circuit switch, essentially the light then literally shines down on these tiny chips. So that's one big direction of networking, but there's a lot. I would say networking is exploding in terms of its capabilities and need, frankly, in the data center. Sonya Huang: So cool. We could do an entire conversation. Amin Vahdat: Yes, it is very, very cool. Sonya Huang: Even going back to the picture from Ineffable, it was all the cables that— Amin Vahdat: Exactly. Yeah. And those cables eventually, some of them, wind up at optical circuit switches, which in our data centers makes sense. Sonya Huang: Okay. I want to flip to talking about power. You've been talking about goodput per watt and other units per watt. It makes me think per watt means power is kind of the binding constraint, or the scarce constraint, or the expensive constraint in some way. Amin Vahdat: So I get asked this question: what is the biggest constraint that we face? And the reality is there is no single biggest constraint that we face. They're all constraints. They're all super hard, and they shift continuously. But if I had to answer fundamentally, I would say that power is the single most fundamental constraint that we face. Everything else, it seems like we know how to solve them, and it's a question of solving them over some period of time. Power—I think the way that you put it is really nice. It's a binding, long-term issue. We do not have a—I mean, nuclear, perhaps nuclear is going to—abundant clean energy would solve a lot of problems, for sure, when that happens. And when it happens at scale is still unknown. Sonya Huang: And so how does it work in practice? You're standing up a new data center. It needs a gigawatt of power. I imagine you can't just call PG&E and say, "Hey, please send a gigawatt of power." So what does provisioning power actually look like? And are you having to vertically integrate all the way down to doing your own turbines? How do you solve the power bottleneck? Amin Vahdat: Yeah, it's a big question, an important question. Our preferred model at Google is always to be utility-connected, to be grid-connected. So it's the equivalent of calling your— Sonya Huang: Oh, so you can just call PG&E? Amin Vahdat: Exactly. You call, very politely, your favorite utility wherever it is that your data center is. And of course you give them many, many years of notice. In other words, if we're talking about gigawatt scale, it's not something that you can say, "Hey, I need a gigawatt tomorrow. When can you start billing me?" It's something that we plan together. For us, it's something that we also take very seriously, from the perspective of ensuring that when we work with these utilities, the costs of putting that infrastructure in place—and we could get into a long conversation just on this topic as well—that we cover those costs. Because with the way that billing works, it actually could be that by the act of the utility building out capacity for us, let's say, other people's rates could go up, in theory. What we ensure is that actually, let's say the transmission lines that have to be built or upgraded, additional utility base stations, et cetera—that we pay for those as well. So there's a long planning process. It can absolutely be the case that—let's say that we need a gigawatt in, I'll make up a date, 2028, and the utility can get us a gigawatt in 2029. They can get us, let's say, 700 megawatts in 2028. So now we might be left with a question of how we cover those 300 megawatts. Well, one answer is just wait. Another answer is to say, okay, well, would we figure out how we generate some subset of that power ourselves? Maybe that would be with solar cells, or with batteries as backup. Would it be from other sources? So then we again work with the utility. It might also be a combination, where we might maintain some power generation local, and have the capability, even when the utility comes online fully—let's say at the gigawatt scale—where we could actually provide power back to the grid, so having that when they need it as well. One way to look at it is there might be the two weeks of the year—maybe it's the hottest two weeks of the year—where there's a huge amount of residential demand. If we have some local generation, we can then provide that back to the grid as well. So it really is working over multiple years with the utilities, for us. Sonya Huang: Why is your preference to work with the utilities, as opposed to vertically integrating yourselves? Amin Vahdat: The main reason is flexibility and uplift on both sides. One way to look at it is statistical multiplexing, or, if you want, the law of large numbers. If we need to have a gigawatt of power—let's say we wanted to have that with 99.99%-plus reliability—that means we have to build two gigawatts of power. At that level, 99.99 or 99.999, you have to have one-plus-one redundancy. That gets expensive. And then making sure that that's going to be ideally a clean energy source, probably right next to our data center—that can also be challenging. Now, if we partner with [a utility], again, maybe we have some amount of that that we can bring ourselves, that we can give to the grid when they need it, and when we need it less, we can take their power. In other words, by leveraging that statistical multiplexing over a much larger base, actually everybody wins. We win, the grid wins, residences win. We prefer that. In rare, rare cases, we will do it behind the meter. But even then, we're doing it under the assumption that we're going to work with the utility, where it might be a year later that we want to be connected to the grid. Again, it's an uplift for us. It's an uplift for the grid. Sonya Huang: Makes sense. How do you decide how big to make a data center? Amin Vahdat: Yeah, that's an art, and it's a source of significant debate. At some point—I remember even 10-plus years ago, 15 years ago—there was a big debate at Google: should we just put everything into one data center? Back then, it was going to be a gigawatt, which was— Sonya Huang: Simpler times. Amin Vahdat: Yeah, different times. 10, 15 years ago, we were going to have a gigawatt data center. So one obvious concern there is single point of failure, right? If you're looking at things from a 30-year perspective, that's a huge concern. On the other hand, if you're talking about training workloads today, bigger is better. In other words, from a networking perspective, you want to have things concentrated in as small a distance as possible. But then again, two issues: single point of failure, but then also now power availability. While a gigawatt was huge 10 or 15 years ago, it was imaginable. There's no way anywhere in the country or the world we're going to get the total requirements of Google built in one place. It's just not going to be possible. So now, what's the optimum size? Again, we have models for this, simulators, et cetera. But it also depends. Look, in some places we're going to be at the edge of the network, or we're going to be in-country—that might be tens of megawatts. We actually partner with ISPs; that might be a rack, literally. It could be a rack. For a training cluster, maybe that's going to be closer to a gigawatt. Some other sites might be hundreds of megawatts. Sonya Huang: I'd love to understand how you think about portfolio lifecycle management. My guess would be that the biggest, newest clusters are used for training the latest frontier model, and then you recycle the older stuff and run inference on it. Is that a fair framework? Are you also standing up inference-specific clusters? How does that all work? Amin Vahdat: It's a very reasonable framework that you're thinking about, and I think it makes a lot of sense. But I would say that the demand for inference is such that we can't just rely on whatever older training clusters that are no longer being fully used for training as the basis for inference. And also, if you think about it, we might centralize, again, in a particular year, into a small number of large sites, our training clusters, and there is benefit to keeping the network distance between them small. So wherever they're located in the world, they're probably going to be, let's say, on the same continent, or they might even be in the same portion of a continent in a particular year. So now you might be left with not enough serving capacity on the other continents. So then, okay, actually we have to go build the specialized inference elsewhere across the world. I think your intuition is spot-on, but not wholly. In other words, yes, the training clusters probably are going to be used for serving in some number of years. But then we're also having to build the serving clusters as well. Sonya Huang: And your serving clusters, are they different than the training clusters? Are they smaller? Are they cheaper per megawatt? Amin Vahdat: Not necessarily cheaper, actually, because for serving there is more need to co-locate compute, networking and storage. And so then we get to the inability to specialize. For training, you actually have this big, dense, uniform deployment. Whereas for serving, you're going to have to have the mix of storage, compute and accelerators. Furthermore—and it's a very interesting aspect of this that we could go into more detail on as well—for serving, you actually don't want to have too much in one place. You want to be serving your workloads from all over the planet. But now we wind up having individual model endpoints, and that actually can be variations of models. So now we have to spread these models out across the world, also accounting for locality. So they will be smaller. They'll actually be less vertically integrated, probably, on the inference side. Sonya Huang: Super interesting. So if you made a data center five years ago—the state-of-the-art accelerator five years ago was very different, vastly less efficient than the ones that are being made today—do you actually go back and swap out the chips in those old data centers? And this relates to an ongoing debate, I think, of what is the actual useful life of a chip? Amin Vahdat: Yeah. So I've been on record as saying this—I was surprised by how much pickup this had—but I said that our seven- and eight-year-old TPUs are still at 100% utilization. Sonya Huang: Wow. Amin Vahdat: And— Sonya Huang: I think I saw this. I didn't realize this. Amin Vahdat: Yeah. I didn't mean for it to be a meaningful statement, but it was a meaningful statement, apparently. So our older TPUs—GPUs too, but our older TPUs—are seeing significant utilization. We do replace them in the end. There's a question of, okay, the depreciation lifetime is approximately six years. So once they're fully depreciated, and given the power efficiency of newer generations, it does make sense to replace them and upgrade them. We do replace the chips, but it's really the systems. In other words, we think in terms of pods. A TPU pod might be 9,600 chips, and it might be 140-something, 152 racks. So then we would say, okay, we're going to pull out that pod and we're going to replace it with a, whatever it is, TPU 12 or 13 or 14 pod. It might not be a perfect fit. The new pod's footprint might not be a perfect fit for the old pod's vacancy. We then just have to account for that and figure out how we would retrofit. We can't plan that, because we don't know what that many generations of TPUs are going to be. So then it's again a bit of an art to figure out how we would—and it's actually hard work—figure out how we would decom and then replace, as quickly as possible, with new TPUs. Sonya Huang: You've written publicly about open standards. Can you say a word on that? Amin Vahdat: Yeah. So we talked about this interoperability question. For us, while we support vertical integration, and we make it possible to extract just as much performance as you want, it's really important to not force lock-in, and not force a sort of walled garden in terms of how the system works. I'll give one example. At Google, we've developed a model development framework called JAX. We like it a lot. We think it's really, really good, and we use it extensively internally. Many of our customers like PyTorch. So one thing we could say is, "Hey, if you want to run on TPUs, you've got to use JAX. It's the best." I'm being facetious a little bit—but maybe it is, maybe it isn't. We think it's the best, and that's your only choice because it's so great. Or we could say, look, if you like JAX, we like JAX. If you like JAX, you can use it. But if you like PyTorch, we have TorchTPU, where your unmodified models can run. And we've seen this throughout history with many, many examples. I've used the example of IP. Why did the Internet Protocol win? There were actually many competing protocols to IP. This is ancient history, in the '70s and early '80s. Why did IP win? It was because it was an open standard, and it was this narrow waist of the hourglass, where anything could run on top in terms of software, and anything could run underneath it in terms of hardware. Open, standard, interoperable. Anyone who brought IP could plug into a router port and become part of the internet. It was beautiful. And that's what allowed the internet to explode in its growth and reach across the world. So we really do believe in those open standards in terms of plug-in points. Now, if you want to plug in something highly specialized, you can. If you think that you've got a better thing to plug into our framework, you absolutely can. But we want to really support open standards, ideally open source around it as well. Sonya Huang: It's too big and too important a buildout to be any one vendor's closed, proprietary stack. Amin Vahdat: We really believe that. And it's got to be one of choice. That's also why, for example, we fully support and have CPUs, GPUs, other accelerators, et cetera. Sonya Huang: How has day-to-day life for your team changed with AI? Where is it changing your function the most? Amin Vahdat: So I think the easiest answer is on the software engineering side, where it's been documented externally quite a bit. We at Google, and my team, are using it to great effect in terms of our software development capabilities, but also, frankly, test rollouts, even helping with design. But on the hardware side, which has maybe gotten less external coverage, there's also been significant change. My hardware engineers—I was just looking at the numbers earlier today, in fact—are using AI. Using whatever the token counts, if you want—not the best metric, but it's still a metric—our hardware engineers are using AI as much as the software engineers are. And productivity has gone up. Time from design kickoff to tape-out is shrinking. Time for bring-up is shrinking. So productivity is going up significantly. But then other, maybe less expected, changes: how we do data center design has changed significantly. How we evaluate—you mentioned, hey, do we do a gigawatt building or a 100-megawatt campus or 200-megawatt campus? In the past, this would be a very detailed, very spreadsheet-driven, human-driven process. And it still is to some extent, but there's a lot of AI now involved that really streamlines the process in terms of planning and development as well. Sonya Huang: Interesting. So, like, reasoning models, or— Amin Vahdat: I wouldn't say quite yet reasoning models. It's not replacing human judgment, but it's making it much easier to bring the necessary information together in one place and basically put the right information in front of the humans making the decisions. Sonya Huang: Okay, I'm going to bring us home with two kind of out-there, fun questions. Question number one: orbital data centers. I've seen that Google is thinking about this quite seriously, and you don't need to comment on that. But does the fact that people are seriously running the numbers on orbital compute mean that there are serious binding constraints on Earth? And what do you think of orbital data centers? Amin Vahdat: Yeah, it's an exciting direction. We are actually pursuing it, and we've referred to it, with no tongue in cheek, as a moonshot—as one of our big efforts that we're excited about investing in. It goes back to the earlier part of the conversation, where you raised, I think correctly, that in terms of fundamental constraints, energy and energy production is a key, key challenge. So the bottom line is, from a fundamentals perspective, in space you have something like 40% more power available, because of lack of attenuation in the atmosphere. In other words, it's just more solar capacity: 1.4x. So that's one part of it. But in a sun-synchronous orbit, you have 98 to 100% coverage of sunlight on your solar cells, relative to 28, 30, maybe 35% on land. So just this enormous amount of power. You take the 1.4x and you take the 3 to 4x in terms of number of hours per day, you remove batteries more or less from the equation, and now you have the potential for something that can really—and of course, carbon-free—lots of benefits. Lots of challenges. Lots and lots of challenges. So, okay, now what about cooling? Naively, you might think cooling in space is easier. It's actually harder. Reliability—we talked about how these things fail sometimes. So repairs become harder. Not impossible, but harder in space. Sonya Huang: You’ll send a little robot up with the cluster? Amin Vahdat: Exactly. So perhaps there'll be—this model is a promising direction. Redundancy will probably be your friend. Your earlier question on free-space optics is now going to become reality. We're probably not going to be stringing fiber between these components. So it will actually be free space, and we're going to have the lasers pointing at the receivers and calibrating in real time. There are no showstoppers here, no fundamental showstoppers. Sonya Huang: Okay. Last question. I've had this image of the Ineffable supercomputer that you built them in my head this whole time. So here's the question: 10 years from now, what will the most frontier supercomputer look like? Amin Vahdat: Oh my gosh. Yeah. So 10 years is right at that edge where—I would say, in all sincerity, probably some people are thinking about what the 2036 computer looks like. We might have a few thinking that far ahead, but wow, the cone of uncertainty there is way, way too wide. If you look at the trends, the level of integration is going to be tremendous. We saw the beautiful fiber in the VR200 racks that we put together for Ineffable. My guess is it's going to be more integrated, less fiber. I won't say no fiber in 2036, but I think that from a rack perspective, the rack will look much more tightly integrated, and the amount of fiber—there'll be maybe a small fiber bundle coming out of the rack. One view you might have, from a modular manufacturing perspective, is these racks in 2036 are likely going to be manufactured centrally. So whether they have 72 or 144 or 288 or probably more—576, 1,152, pick your favorite multiple—of GPUs, since we're talking about the Ineffable case, but it'd be the same for the TPUs: deeply integrated into a rack. What would a rack be? Multiple megawatts. We don't know exactly how, but in 2036, we get to imagine things could be multiple megawatts in a single rack. And now you bring water and you bring power and you bring fiber, right? You wheel that rack in, you plug those three things in, and you're off to the races. Sonya Huang: Okay, so it's not going to be a big alien orb off in space, then? Amin Vahdat: By 2036, I wouldn't say it's not possible for it to be directly launched into space, and then maybe taken by a robotic arm at some space station and plugged into the right module. Yeah, maybe that for 2036. Fun, fun, fun to think about. Sonya Huang: I really enjoyed this conversation. This is the most intense, biggest CapEx buildout in history. But I also think it's a technology revolution that is a thing of beauty. And I think you have such a grasp over the beauty of the technology and the binding constraints and how to balance it all. Google is in good hands. Thank you for taking the time to share what you're doing. Amin Vahdat: A ton of fun. We get to live through this, and we get to define it. So thank you very much. This was a great conversation. Sonya Huang: Thank you. Amin Vahdat: Thanks. <div class="framer-mcvrsd" id="

At 100,000-accelerator scale, something fails multiple times an hour, which is why Google's Chief Technologist for AI Infrastructure Amin Vahdat thinks FLOPS is a vanity metric. The metric that matters is what he calls goodput: the useful work a workload actually delivers through real failures. Amin walks through the calculus that split the TPU line into 8i and 8t for the first time, why the TPU's core primitives haven't changed since v1, and how Google and DeepMind co-design in the same rooms, intercepting chip architectures mid-flight before tape-out. He explains why long-horizon agents are sending demand for CPUs and storage through the roof alongside accelerators, how optical circuit switches reroute light to a spare rack in milliseconds, and why Google would rather wait on a utility than build its own gigawatt. We also cover orbital data centers and the multi-megawatt rack of 2036.

Hosted by Sonya Huang, Sequoia Capital

0:00 – Introduction

1:47 – What makes a data center an AI data center

5:30 – Goodput, not FLOPS: holding yourself accountable when something fails every hour

11:52 – Doubling token capacity every six months, and where the gains actually come from

15:32 – The TPU bet: from a contrarian call in 2013 to splitting 8i and 8t

23:30 – The case for and against co-design

26:11 – Shoulder to shoulder with DeepMind: intercepting chips mid-flight

34:16 – Long-horizon agents change the shape of the data center

37:50 – Optical circuit switching and the state of networking

42:35 – Power is the binding constraint: utilities, gigawatts, and sizing a data center

49:23 – Training vs. serving clusters, seven-year-old TPUs, and open standards

58:29 – Orbital data centers and the supercomputer of 2036

本集资源与出处